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“You will die but the carbon will not; its career does not end with you.”
—Jacob Bronowski

I. WHAT HAS THE NINTH CIRCUIT DONE?
Can the Ninth Circuit reverse key analysis and opinions of the
U.S. Supreme Court? Can a federal circuit court, based on environmental grounds that climate change allows the states to act as their
own laboratories to try innovative programs, reorient or contradict Supreme Court precedent regarding the Commerce Clause of the Constitution? Maybe.
A.

The Ninth Circuit 2013 Constitutional Opinion

A majority panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals threw down
the legal gauntlet in 2013 regarding climate change and global warming in California. The decision reversed the federal district court opinion finding the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) clearly
unconstitutional.1 The majority overturned the trial court opinion in
every aspect—whether there was facial discrimination in the California LCFS, the strict scrutiny standard of review applied to the regulation, whether California’s action was impermissibly extraterritorial,
and whether the regulation was unduly burdensome on interstate
commerce pursuant to the Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause.2
This was a fundamental reversal.
The court of appeals, by a 2-1 opinion, entered partial summary
judgment in favor of California and remanded for further proceedings
on still-to-be-determined issues of federal constitutional preemption.3
It did not apply strict scrutiny in analyzing the California regulation,
and instructed instead that a balancing test be applied under Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.4 This decision appears to have fundamentally
changed the Supreme Court’s calculus for permissible state regulation
of carbon-emitting activities within the state and the movement of
goods in interstate commerce:
• The legal rationale of the Ninth Circuit majority in this case
reconfigured the application of decades of Supreme Court decisions regarding the dormant Commerce Clause as applied to environmental aspects of the interstate movement of commerce.
• This opinion creates a new, permissible fail-safe mechanism for
states to block the movement of out-of-state trash into their ter1. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey (Rocky Mountain III), 730 F.3d 1070
(9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)).
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ritory, despite the Supreme Court outlawing such attempts in
several decisions over decades.
• This new holding makes viable corollary state regulation over
methane, a global warming gas more than twenty times more
powerful, molecule for molecule, than CO2,5 produced by decaying trash from any location including imported out-of-state
trash.6
• The primary CO2-creating anthropogenic activities are use of vehicle fuels, electricity production, and agriculture. Through incentives to in-state power production,7 California or any other
state can now burden consumption of out-of-state power in interstate commerce.
• Similar rationales used to limit greenhouse gases (GHG) could
also be applied to burden importation into a state of agricultural
products, and even impose a fee on airplane passengers who
land in state.
The Ninth Circuit decision reconfigured the past half-century of
Supreme Court interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause. And
that is where this Article focuses—can global warming change interpretation of the Constitution? California previously argued this unsuccessfully in a 2010 case.8 What makes this recent Ninth Circuit
decision intriguing:
• Two of the four federal judges who heard this case disagreed
with the two-judge majority of the 9th Circuit on constitutionality,9 even disregarding a state court judge who held that the
LCFS violated state administrative law.10
• There are several other cases which have contested other aspects of A.B. 32, the California carbon regulation, and California
has lost or settled the majority.11
5. See STEVEN FERREY, UNLOCKING THE GLOBAL WARMING TOOLBOX 15 tbl.2-1
(2010).
6. Anna Karion, et al., Methane Emissions Estimate from Airborne Measurements
over a Western United States Natural Gas Field, 40 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS
4393 (2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/R8EY-5AU9.
7. See FERREY, supra note 5, at 251–54.
8. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2010).
9. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene (Rocky Mountain II), 843 F. Supp.
2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014). The original federal trial court judge in this matter issued a contrary opinion finding
multiple California violations of the Commerce Clause.
10. POET, LLC v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 218 Cal. App. 4th 681 (2013).
11. Steven Ferrey, The Carbon Suite in the Hotel California, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 451 (2014).

2015]

OVERRULING THE SUPREME COURT

811

• On environmental matters, the Ninth Circuit is the most reversed federal court when matters proceed to the Supreme
Court.12
• Almost simultaneously, two other federal circuit courts of appeals, ruling on different state energy regulations, found that
there was a violation by the state of the Commerce Clause or the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.13
We will find out what is next. The request for a rehearing en banc
to the full panel of the Ninth Circuit failed to get a majority.14 The
Supreme Court, in 2014, did not accept certiorari in the Rocky Mountain appeal. It certainly is not taught in law school textbooks that a
lower court can change holdings of the Supreme Court.
There are instances where lower federal courts have exercised creativity to define key terms in environmental matters that result in
effectively reversing the Supreme Court’s intent in its prior opinion.15
However, here, we have the elements necessary for a perfect legal
storm. The case concerns one of the most controversial and contentious policy issues in the country, and perhaps the world: climate
change control and regulation; and it is an environmental decision
rendered by the federal circuit court which among the twelve in the
nation is the circuit whose environmental decisions are most reversed
or overruled by the Supreme Court.16
The case holds in its ultimate disposition the entire future of state
climate change policies and actions in the United States. The federal
government has not taken affirmative action on energy regulation in
the electric sector in the past two decades, with minor exception.17
This has left sustainable energy to the states, which have initiated a
host of sustainable energy regulatory initiatives.18 California was not
12. Carol Williams, U.S. Supreme Court looks over 9th Circuit’s shoulder, L.A. TIMES,
June 29, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/29/local/me-9th-scotus29,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/S66K-HX8E. In the Supreme Court session
ending in 2009, including environmental matters, the Ninth Circuit was overturned in 15 of the 16 cases reviewed that term by the U.S. Supreme Court.
13. See infra subsections IV.A.1–2.
14. Appellees’ Motion for Rehearing En Banc, Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070
(9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014) (Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135).
15. See infra section IV.B.
16. See Williams, supra note 12.
17. In the past decade, the only significant federal energy legislation, other than tax
incentives, was the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 15801 (2012), a relatively modest statute (although it did require net metering by the states, which
has not been uniformly followed in every state), and the Energy Independence &
Security Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 17071 (2012), which largely dealt with fuels and
appliance efficiency, rather than a bill addressing electric industry operations.
18. See Steven Ferrey, Efficiency in the Regulatory Crucible: Navigating 21st Century
‘Smart’ Technology and Power, 3 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 1, 18–20,
24–26 (2012).
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the first state to impose carbon control—in fact it was not one of the
first ten states to impose carbon control.19
Yet, California is now the important canary in the coal mine. California has been challenged for taking ultra vires administrative actions not authorized by either state law or the U.S. Constitution, and
it has been challenged for those actions discriminating against interstate commerce.20 There were plenty of signposts from those states
which had gone before.21 Of particular note, it is not just the regulated community that has taken legal issue with the California sustainable energy program. Rather, California is also challenged by
environmental groups, by groups representing low-income consumers,
and by businesses operating outside the state.22
These California challenges and recent results portend the scope of
the U.S. carbon-control future and a sustainable economy. Unconstitutional actions by government have a tangible cost to taxpayers: a
recent determination that a state engaged in an unconstitutional regulatory action regarding energy resulted in a trial court order holding
the state liable for multiple millions of dollars for attorneys’ fees and
costs incurred by all parties in the case,23 and plaintiffs are asking
that their fees be paid in a number of other recent claims against state
energy regulation in California24 and in other states.25
19. See FERREY, supra note 5, at 79–80, 91–92; Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: State
Programs on Global Warming and the Constitution, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835 (2009)
(noting ten states participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiatives
(RGGI) program prior to California’s program).
20. Ferrey, supra note 11.
21. Steven Ferrey, Follow the Money! Article I and Article VI Constitutional Barriers
to Renewable Energy in the U.S. Future, 17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 89 (2012); Steven
Ferrey, Chad Laurent & Cameron Ferrey, Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy
and Carbon Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 125 (2010); Steven Ferrey, Chad Laurent & Cameron Ferrey, FiT in the U.S.A., PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, June 2010, http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2010/05/fit-usa, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8UJWK7WB; Ferrey, supra note 19; Steven Ferrey, Shaping American Power: Federal
Preemption and Technological Change, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 47 (1991); Brian Potts,
Regulating Greenhouse Gas ‘Leakage’: How California Can Evade the Impending
Constitutional Attacks, ELECTRICITY J., June 2006, at 43–44 (“[B]ecause of these
two constitutional issues, courts are likely to strike down many or all of their
proposals.”).
22. Ferrey, supra note 11.
23. See Energy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Vt.
2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013). Similar request for
fees are pending for plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges in cases in California,
New Jersey, and Maryland.
24. See Motion for Attorney Fees, Planning & Conservation League v. California, No.
RG 12626904 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2013).
25. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790 (D. Md. 2013), aff’d, 753
F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014) (field preemption and conflict preemption on wholesale
power prices); PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F.Supp.2d 372 (D. N.J. 2013),
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Does This Lead Down a New Constitutional Path?

Will California or other states, now in the interest of GHG reduction, choose to burden or restrict other out-of-state commerce and
products being sold in the state? The impact on other commerce based
on the fact that it must be shipped into California is the most interesting, if to date unnoticed, aspect of this new decision. I explore its nuances in this Article. If a state is regulating GHGs, should it
comprehensively discourage use of products and commerce created
outside the state by each major CO2-emitting sector in the state—fuels, electricity, agriculture, etc.? The Ninth Circuit decision would allow this for the first time, and even opines that California “should be
encouraged to continue and expand its efforts to find a workable solution to lower carbon emission.”26
As a side revenue benefit in addition to the professed goal of reducing GHGs, the states regulating carbon have also, for the first time in
history,27 reconfigured this environmental regulation to generate billions of dollars in revenues.28 The ten Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) states raised approximately $1 billion of
RGGI auction proceeds realized from their auctions in 2009–2011.29
California’s A.B. 32 is expected to raise $11–70 billion.30
At the very least, the Ninth Circuit majority decision has created a
new interpretive “virtual split,” if not a split on the exact same state
regulatory action on energy, among three circuit courts which in 2013
interpreted application of the Constitution to the state regulation of
aspects of sustainable energy and infrastructure:
• In 2013, the 7th Circuit unanimously declared that it is a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution for a
state to treat renewable power originating out of state differently than renewable power originating in state.31

26.
27.
28.
29.

30.

31.

aff’d sub nom. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014)
(field preemption on wholesale power prices and rates).
Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2884 (2014).
FERREY, supra note 5, at 82–83.
Id. at 191.
As determined individually by each state, 52% of RGGI funds were used for energy efficiency, 11% for renewable energy, 14% to reduce consumer rates, and 1%
for other programs, as determined in an RGGI report. See RGGI INC., INVESTMENT OF PROCEEDS FROM RGGI CO2 ALLOWANCES (2011), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/49QX-G422.
See Laura Mahoney, Superior Court Rules Greenhouse Gas Allowance Auction
Fees Are Not Taxes, BLOOMBERG BNA ENV’T REPORTER, Nov. 22, 2013, https://
www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X3NK7KHS000000, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/K8CH-3Y7T.
Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir.
2013), cert. denied sub nom. Schuette v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 134 S.
Ct. 12787 (2014); Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regula-
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• In 2012, a federal trial court, not overturned by the Second Circuit, held that it is unconstitutional for a state to regulate lowcarbon power in a way that affects its ability to freely enter interstate commerce and cross state lines.32
These three contemporaneous 2013 federal circuit court decisions
all hinge on the restrictions imposed by the Constitution’s dormant
Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause on state regulation of energy. If a state can legally impose regulation creating financial burdens based on the distance travelled by out-of-state commerce to enter
the state, as the Ninth Circuit majority has upheld regarding renewable fuels,33 this could apply to all interstate commerce transported
across states lines. A state could provide similar regulation burdening
out-of-state commerce in electric power, agricultural products, food,
and motor fuels—the primary sources of GHG emissions.34 Under the
Ninth Circuit majority holding, such regulation on environmental
grounds would be legally justified, unlike, to date, under Supreme
Court decisions.
The sections of this Article which follow analyze each implication
of this new decision. Section II examines the California program, the
federal trial court decision, the position of law professor amici, the
new Ninth Circuit majority decision, and the dissent. Section III analyzes how the Ninth Circuit majority opinion alters interpretations in
a half dozen regards compared to decades of Supreme Court precedent. Section IV analyzes the 2013 “virtual” split in three federal circuit courts of appeals on the application of the Constitution to state
regulation of energy, and the possibility of changing critical judicial
history prior to any eventual Supreme Court resolution. Section V examines the legal implications of the Ninth Circuit decision to allow
tory Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1278 (2014). Judge Richard Posner, in a unanimous
decision, relied on a 2012 law review article on constitutional energy jurisdiction
issues authored by the Author. Id. at 776 (citing Steven Ferrey, Threading the
Constitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Energy, 7. TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 59, 69, 106–07
(2012)). The Seventh Circuit declared unconstitutional state regulation limiting
state renewable portfolio standards to in-state generation, as a violation of the
Commerce Clause: “[Michigan’s argument] trips over an insurmountable constitutional objection. Michigan cannot, without violating the commerce clause of
Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy.”
Id.
32. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 236–39 (D.
Vt. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013).
33. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884
(2014).
34. See Carbon Pollution Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa
.gov/carbon-pollution-standards (last visited Feb. 7, 2015), archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/443R-88NH.
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states to burden out-of-state commerce in the pursuit of climate
moderation.
II. THE MULTIBILLION DOLLAR NINTH CIRCUIT
QUESTION IN CALIFORNIA
A.

The California Low Carbon Fuel Standard

California is the twelfth largest greenhouse gas (GHG) producer in
the world.35 California is larger in its carbon emissions than twothirds of the Annex I developed nations regulated under the Kyoto
Protocol. A.B. 32, the California Global Warming Solutions Act of
2006 (GWSA), requires the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to
develop a comprehensive plan to reduce GHG emissions in the state to
its historic 1990 levels by the year 2020.36 This equates to an eventual estimated 25%–29% reduction from business-as-usual GHG emission levels.37
The program establishes a declining limit on approximately 85% of
the state’s total GHG emissions, declining over time to reach its goal.
“Covered sources” must surrender “compliance instruments” to CARB
that are equal to their GHG emissions.38 California’s comprehensive
cap-and-trade program, prior to lawsuits which delayed it,39 was to
commence in 2012.
As part of this program, the purpose of the LCFS is “to implement
a low carbon fuel standard, which will reduce GHG emissions by reducing the full fuel-cycle, carbon intensity of the transportation fuel
used in California.”40 The LCFS was “designed to reduce California’s
dependence on petroleum” and “to stimulate the production and use of
35. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N & CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, PROPOSED FINAL OPINION SUMMARY ON GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATORY STRATEGIES 2 (2008)
36. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West 2007).
37. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N & CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 35, at 1; Climate
Change Briefing: California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, M.J. BRADLEY
& ASSOCS., LLC (2006), https://web.archive.org/web/20070208230748/http://www
.mjbradley.com/briefingspecialab32.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
DFR9-5YCE. The GWSA sets a target of reducing statewide emissions to 427
million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2E) of greenhouse
gasses by the year 2020, and highlights reduction measures that were adopted in
2011 to meet this goal. California’s goal was based on projections that it was on
pace to emit 507 or more MMTCO2E by 2020. See CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY AIR RES. BD., STATUS OF SCOPING PLAN RECOMMENDED MEASURES (2008),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/T9ZV-557W for reduction measures for the
GWSA.
38. CAL. AIR RES. BD., WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFSET CREDITS AND HOW
ARE THEY USED? (2012), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/2H3E-P2JJ.
39. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65 (2012).
40. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2010).
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alternative, low-carbon fuels in California.”41 The LCFS rule is to reduce the carbon content of transportation fuels sold in California by
10% by the year 2020 from the year 2010 baseline42 through a “set of
regulations to govern the marketing of gasoline-ethanol blends sold in
California.”43
It requires providers of gasoline and diesel fuels to calculate the
carbon intensity (CI) of each fuel component, report such calculations
to CARB, and make reductions in order to meet the carbon intensity
standards,44 a metric designed to assess “the amount of lifecycle
greenhouse gas emissions, per unit of energy of fuel delivered, expressed in grams of carbon dioxide per megajoule.”45 The LCFS regulates transportation fuels that are “sold, supplied, or offered for sale in
California.”46 Carbon intensity is not limited to only how much carbon the fuel contains, but also includes the amount of carbon released
in the full fuel cycle. CARB’s LCFS rule includes the lifecycle GHG
emissions of fuel, including emissions produced during production and
transportation of fuels to California. The LCFS refers to this inclusive
concept as the “lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions,” which is defined
as:
aggregate quantity of greenhouse gas emissions (including direct emissions
and significant indirect emissions such as significant emissions from land use
changes), as determined by the Executive Officer, related to the full fuel lifecycle, including all stages of fuel and feedstock production and distribution,
from feedstock generation or extraction through the distribution and delivery
and use of the finished fuel to the ultimate consumer, where the mass values
for all greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their relative global
warming potential.47

To lower their carbon intensity scores, providers may blend lowcarbon ethanol into gasoline.48 However, the location of the origination of commerce in fuels is a significant factor in one’s score. For example, corn-derived ethanol produced in the Midwest is assigned a
higher carbon intensity score than chemically similar corn-derived
ethanol produced anywhere in California, regardless of its transportation within California.49 Thus, a chemically identical ethanol im41. CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY AIR RES. BD., FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS 457
(2009).
42. CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY AIR RES. BD., FINAL REGULATION ORDER (2009),
archived at https://perma.unl.edu/7NKB-AH2X.
43. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene (Rocky Mountain I), 719 F. Supp.
2d 1170, 1177 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95481(a)(28) (2010).
48. Rocky Mountain I, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Providers may also buy credits generated from another fuel provider that has credits in order to meet LFCS standards. Id.
49. Id. at 1177–78.
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ported from the Midwest can receive a higher carbon intensity score
than ethanol produced anywhere in California, ultimately rendering
the Midwest product disadvantaged and more expensive for fuel providers seeking to meet the California fuel standard requirements.
The CI calculation does not account for intrastate shipping within
the state, notwithstanding that California is the third largest U.S.
state geographically. California’s 770 miles in length is greater than
the distance from points in ten other states to California. Thus, all
fuel, wherever produced in California and wherever consumed, does
not incur a higher carbon transportation factor for purposes of this
regulation. The state of Oregon adopted its own low carbon fuel standard for transportation fuel,50 similar but not identical to LCFS in
California, and supported California by filing an amicus brief in the
Rocky Mountain case.51 This raises the specter of different fuel standards, which producers will need to satisfy in different states.
B.

The State Law Challenge to the LCFS

There were two legal challenges to the LCFS: one in state court
raising state administrative and environmental law claims, and the
second in federal court raising Constitutional issues.52 The largest
ethanol producer in the United States challenged the LCFS rule in
California state court, alleging a failure to comply with the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).53 CARB’s proposed regulations
were required to meet procedural requirements for rulemaking in California’s Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and substantive and
procedural requirements in CEQA.
Plaintiff POET, LLC challenged the LCFS regulations on the
grounds that CARB violated the APA and CEQA during the adoption
process. It contended that CARB violated the APA by excluding certain emails from consultants from the rulemaking file made available

50. THE OREGON DEP’T OF ENERGY, CLIMATE CHANGE INTEGRATION GROUP, FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR (2008), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/BZP4-XZY5.
51. Brief of the States of Oregon, Maryland, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Washington as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, Rocky Mountain III,
730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014) (Nos. 12-15131,
12-15135), 2012 WL 2376702.
52. See infra sections II.C–F.
53. POET, LLC v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 218 Cal. App. 4th 681 (2013). POET argued that
CARB failed to respond to numerous public comments, that it omitted documents
from the rulemaking file, and that the LCFS will lead to increased GHG emissions, not the reductions it promises. POET alleged that CARB’s LCFS rule exceeds the scope of authority delegated to it by the legislature. Id.
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to the public.54 Ethanol is the only biofuel given an increased carbon
rating based on land-use changes.55
The state trial court in this state law challenge found against the
challengers, but subsequently was reversed on appeal.56 The appellate court held that California had, in fact, violated CEQA and the
California APA by approving the regulation before the required review
of the environmental implications under CEQA of the environmental
implications.57 The court also found that CARB had improperly deferred formulating required mitigation measures.58 However, after
ruling against the state, the court refrained from enjoining the regulation under state law.59 The parties were directed to submit comments
about remedies for these violations.60
C.

The Federal Trial Court Constitutional Challenge

The LCFS rule was challenged in a second court case alleging it
violated federal constitutional law, separate from the suit raising California state law claims.61 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene challenged the LCFS rule as violating the dormant Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.62 The plaintiffs alleged that CARB discriminated against interstate commerce and fuels produced out of
state.63
Specifically, the LCFS regulation incorporates into its calculations
the differences between indirectly associated carbon emissions from
transportation, the farming methods used to raise the agricultural
produce, and the fuel used to produce the electricity in the state and
used where the agricultural product is converted to ethanol.64 In order to meet such standards, out-of-state competitors somehow would
need to spend more on the production and transportation of the ethanol to California to reduce the resultant carbon intensity scores
equivalent to those of California’s in-state producers.
54. Id. The emails spoke of the computer model that CARB used to calculate the
indirect carbon emissions attributable to ethanol due to land-use changes caused
by the increased demand for the crops used to produce ethanol.
55. Id. Assigning ethanol a higher carbon content based on indirect land-use change
is controversial because many uncertainties affect the estimates for the land-use
changes and the carbon emissions resulting from those changes.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Rocky Mountain II, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078 (E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d sub
nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1088.
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The plaintiffs submitted that, in fact, their out-of-state ethanol
products are chemically identical to comparable ethanol products
manufactured in California, yet CARB assigned the Midwestern lowcarbon fuel a higher carbon intensity value, making it ultimately costdisadvantaged and less desirable to California consumers.65 The
plaintiffs contended that California fuel consumers seeking to meet
emissions obligations will seek in-state fuels with lower CI values at a
premium, inflating the cost of in-state fuels at the expense of out-ofstate producers.66 CARB’s defense focused on illustrating that the
market for Midwestern low-carbon fuel was robust, rather than disproving the California regulation’s differential burdens based on the
geographic origin of the commerce.67 The suit contested violation
under the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution and the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.68
1.

Discrimination Against Out-of-State Commerce

In December 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of California upheld the plaintiffs’ argument, invalidating certain
parts of the LCFS rule and enjoining the rule’s enforcement, as it “discriminates against out-of-state corn-derived ethanol while favoring instate corn ethanol and impermissibly regulates extraterritorial conduct.”69 The court held that the LCFS differentiates based on place of
65. Plaintiffs argued that Midwestern ethanol fuels were over 10% higher in carbon
intensity than chemically identical California counterparts. Id. at 1087.
66. Id. at 1085–87; see Plainfiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 7–9, Rocky Mountain II, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (No. 1:09-CV-02234LJO-DLB), 2010 WL 5882459.
67. The state’s memorandum to the court included a subsection titled “Investment
Activity in the Midwest Ethanol Industry is Robust.” Defendant and DefendantIntervenor’s Supplemental Memorandom of Points and Authorities in Opposition
to RMFU’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, Rocky Mountain II, 843 F. Supp.
2d 1071 (Nos. 1:09-CV-02234-LJO-DLB, 1:10-CV00163-LJO-DLB), 2011 WL
1233984. The science used by CARB for the LCFS was found to rely too heavily
on factors of origin to pass the federal trial court’s facial discrimination test. Id.
at 1087. Although the same scientific methods are applied to all fuel sources in
the LCFS Table 6, the court found that “the variables within the formula favor
California ethanol producers by assigning lower CI scores based on location” and
thus favor California producers over out-of-state producers. Id. at 1087–88.
Some international fuels using different organic sources actually had lower CI
scores than U.S. fuels using other feedstocks. Sugarcane-based ethanol, imported from South America, was awarded lower CI value than in-state California
corn-derived ethanol because of the fuel’s chemical composition, production, and
refinement, although this does not affect interstate commerce burdens. Id. at
1089.
68. Id. at 1078.
69. Id. at 1081. CARB attributed the difference in carbon intensity values to multiple scientific factors in addition to geographic location factors (emissions related
to shipping or transportation of fuel). Id. at 1087–88. The court relied upon a
table of Carbon Intensity values generated by CARB. Id. at 1087.
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origin of the commerce and concluded that the LCFS discriminates on
its face against out-of-state, corn-derived ethanol.70 “Regulating outof-state conduct” is not the only test applied under the dormant Commerce Clause; the broader definition of discrimination “simply means
differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests
that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”71
The court found that the LCFS serves a legitimate local purpose;72
however, defendants had not met their burden to show that a nondiscriminatory means to adequately serve their objective was unavailable.73 The Supreme Court precedent in Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison74 requires a state to choose the least discriminatory or intrusive-on-interstate-commerce means to regulate, and also prohibits a
state from impermissibly controlling conduct outside its borders.75
The court found that CARB had several other means to address the
State’s purpose to reduce GHGs without discriminating against outof-state fuel products.76
The court held that the LCFS “may not impose a barrier to interstate commerce based on the distance that the product must travel in
interstate commerce.”77 The district court reached this conclusion by
relying on Dean Milk and West Lynn Creamery v. Healy.78 Although
the LCFS had administrative procedures that allow for out-of-state
producers to amend their CI rankings, the court saw these administrative procedures as amplifying the discriminatory impact of the reg70. Id.
71. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
Under the Pike test, courts will uphold a nonfacially discriminatory statute “unless the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
72. Rocky Mountain II, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs argued that the LCFS serves no local purpose, but rather California is attempting
to solve the national and international problem of climate change. The defendant
State cited Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), where the Supreme Court
affirmed “a state has a local and legitimate interest in reducing global warming.”
Rocky Mountain II, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
73. Id. The court did recognize that lifecycle analysis is a widely accepted national
and international approach to reduce carbon emissions, but this does not mean
there is not a nondiscriminatory means to achieve this goal on a local level. Id.
The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs offered many nondiscriminatory alternatives including a tax on fossil fuels or solely regulating tailpipe emissions. Id.
74. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
75. Rocky Mountain II, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
76. See, e.g., Dean Milk, 340 U.S. 349.
77. Rocky Mountain II, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
78. Id. (citing Dean Milk, 340 U.S. 349 (invalidating a local ordinance requiring milk
sold in the city be pasteurized within five miles of the city); West Lynn Creamery
v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (holding that a differential burden placed at any
point in the stream of commerce on out-of-state producers is constitutionally
invalid)).
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ulations.79 Even though the LCFS benefited some other out-of-state
producers or burdened some in-state producers, the trial court held
that this did not absolve the LCFS from a finding that it discriminates
on its face:80 “[L]egislation favoring in-state economic interests is
facially invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause, even when such
legislation also burdens some in-state interests or includes some outof-state interests in the favored classification.”81
2.

California Regulation Beyond State Borders

The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs alternatively asserted that strict
scrutiny still applied because under the Commerce Clause, one state’s
laws cannot “control conduct beyond the boundary of the state.”82 The
defendants countered that the only effects the LCFS had on out-ofstate producers were indirect and therefore did not directly regulate
outside California’s boundaries.83 The court found for plaintiffs, identifying the issue as “whether the practical effect of the regulation is to
control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”84
The LCFS required all commercial providers, whether within the
state or outside, to detail the entire geographic pathway of the fuel
during its lifetime so that CARB may assign it a carbon intensity
score. The court held that “this type of regulation ‘forc[es] a merchant
to seek regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in another,’ causing the LCFS to ‘directly regulate[] interstate
commerce.’”85 The court pointed out that although the products may
be ultimately sold in California, the Commerce Clause prevents CARB
and the LCFS from regulating those portions of the lifecycle of these
products outside of the state. Under the Commerce Clause, states
79. Id. at 1090. It is at the sole discretion of CARB to amend Table 6 and the carbon
intensity rankings. CARB can further the discrimination by amending in-state
producer’s ranking while denying an out-of-state producer’s similar request without reason. Id.
80. Id. at 1089. For example, Brazilian sugarcane ethanol has a lower intensity score
than some Californian corn ethanol and in-state producers of corn ethanol are
penalized when importing corn from out-of-state. Id.
81. Id. at 1089 (quoting Daghlian v. DeVry Univ., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243 (C.D.
Cal. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
82. Id. at 1090 (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989)). The Rocky
Mountain plaintiffs cited such examples as the LCFS regulating land use in the
Midwest and deforestation in South America rather than solely regulating ethanol carbon emissions within the borders of California. Id. at 1091–92.
83. Id. at 1091.
84. Id. (quoting Healy, 491 U.S. at 336).
85. Id. at 1092. If a provider changes its part of the fuels lifecycle, such as changing
its transportation mechanism to California, this change must be submitted to
CARB. Id.
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cannot place restrictions on imports “in order to control commerce in
other states.”86
3.

Preemption of California Regulation

The plaintiffs alternatively argued that CARB’s LCFS regulations
were preempted by federal environmental law.87 The plaintiffs asserted that the LCFS closed off California to those federally
grandfathered biorefineries which would need either to not participate
in the California ethanol fuel market or reduce their carbon emissions,
although not so required by federal law.88 The defendants opposed
the plaintiffs’ preemption claim not on the merits, but on procedural
defenses based on lack of standing to bring the claim and lack of causation.89 The court held that while individual plaintiffs did not provide evidence of individual standing, at least one of the industry
plaintiffs’ members suffered an actual injury which established associational standing.90
86. Id.
87. The petitioners asserted that the 2007 amendment to the Clean Air Act and the
Energy Independence & Security Act of 2007 precluded CARB from its state-level
LCFS program. California retorted that regulating emissions is within traditional state police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of citizens, and
“[a]ir pollution prevention falls under the broad police powers of the states . . . .
Environmental regulation traditionally has been a matter of state authority.”
Appellants’ Opening Brief at 9, Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014) (Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135), 2012 WL
2338857 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. EPA, 217 F.3d 1245, 1255 (9th Cir.
2000)). There is a “savings clause” for states in the Clean Air Act (“nothing in
this act shall preclude or deny the right of any state or political subdivision
thereof to adopt or enforce [any pollution standard] . . . except that such
State . . . may not adopt or enforce any standard which is less stringent than the
[federal] standard . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012).
88. Rocky Mountain II, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1095. The plaintiffs asserted that these
federal objectives included reducing the United States’ greenhouse emissions, enhancing energy independence and protecting preexisting investment in renewable energy. Plaintiffs argued that Congress struck a balance by not mandating
preexisting biorefineries to reduce their lifecycle carbon emissions as outlined in
the statute. Id. at 1094–95.
89. Id. at 1095. Under standing requirements, a plaintiff must show “(1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that there injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (quoting
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81
(2000)).
90. Id. at 1099–1100. The court pointed to two affidavits that named specific plants
that would be harmed by the LCFS and alleged injuries that had been suffered,
which led it to find that the first prong was satisfied. Id. Growth Energy had
previously submitted evidence that satisfied this prong. Id. at 1100. Plaintiffs
had to meet the following requirements in order to establish association standing:
“its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; the inter-
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Having already found the LCFS illegal, the federal district court
did not resolve the preemption claim, holding that petitioners lacked
standing to raise it. The doctrine of conflict preemption is triggered
when a state law actually conflicts with a federal law and therefore a
party cannot comply with both the state and federal law.91 Because
the state opposed an as-applied preemption challenge while the plaintiffs opposed a facial challenge, the court required future briefing on
these different issues and the standards of review that should be
used,92 and denied “without prejudice the Rocky Mountain plaintiffs’
summary judgment motion related to its preemption claim.”93 The
Ninth Circuit stayed the district court’s injunction in April 2012,
pending appeal.94
D.

The Ninth Circuit Majority

The Ninth Circuit reversed the federal trial court on the unconstitutionality of the California LCFS.95 The trial court decision was
overturned as to the standard of review to apply to the regulation,
whether the regulation was facially discriminatory and violated the
Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause, and whether the California
action was impermissibly extraterritorial.96 With a dissent, the 2–1
Circuit majority did not apply strict scrutiny to the California regulation, and instructed on remand that a balancing test be applied pursuant to Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.97
In contrast to some precedent, the Rocky Mountain majority decision stated that it is not unconstitutional for a state to impose a regulation whose effect is for only out-of-state commerce to purchase
additional credits and pay additional fees: “California may regulate
with reference to local harms, structuring its internal markets to set
incentives for firms to produce less harmful products for sale in California.”98 Because goods were transported using fossil fuels, by definition, a state can regulate to disfavor such goods originating and

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

ests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit.” Id. at 1109. The court disagreed with CARB regarding
the first prong of the associational standing test, finding that at least one of the
industry plaintiffs’ members suffered an actual injury and would have the right
to sue on its own. Id. at 1109–10.
Id. at 1101.
Id. at 1102–03.
Id. at 1103.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, No. 1:09-cv-02234-LJOGSA (E.D.
Cal. Apr. 27, 2012).
Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884
(2014).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1104.
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travelling from out-of-state. This discriminated, by its design, on the
distance goods travel in interstate commerce, which is geographic discrimination based on the point of origin of the commerce.99 The court
stated, “The dormant Commerce Clause does not require California to
ignore the real differences in carbon intensity among out-of-state”
product pathways to California, including the type of electricity consumed in the region of production and the distance of travel of the
product to California.100
The majority decided that California has discretion to construct
the different zones for attribution of different amounts of GHG emissions, including zones for categorizing commerce along state boundaries.101 They also concluded that “[p]erfection in making the
necessary classification is neither possible nor necessary.”102 The
Ninth Circuit held that precision can be sacrificed for “the need to reduce the compliance costs of the system.”103 This applied both to categories for transportation GHG emissions from longer distances and
generalized GHG emissions assigned to regional electricity production: “[a]s with transportation, drawing the regional categories otherwise might only make CARB’s assessment less accurate to the
detriment of the public.”104
The majority held that “Midwest producers’ use of coal-fired electricity also does not merit respect under Hunt.”105 The court concluded that the Supreme Court’s precedent in Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Commission106 did not apply to ethanol. This
shifted the analysis from examination of an arbitrary discriminatory
value, imposed in the Oregon Waste107 and Hunt cases, to a more scientifically derived discriminatory index imposed on out-of-state commerce. However, despite what the majority stated, it also shifted a
primary element of discrimination back to the distance of travel of articles in interstate commerce. Thus, there was geographic discriminatory effect based on the point of origin of the commerce before it
traveled the distance to California.
E.

Professors as Friends of the Court

A small group of environmental law professors filed an amicus
brief as a “friend of the court,” taking a position to support California’s
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See infra section III.A.
Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d at 1093.
Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1094 (quoting Mass. Bd.of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1096.
Id. at 1092.
432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977).
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
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statute.108 This amicus brief spent the initial three-quarters of the
brief talking about how the affected plaintiffs–appellees should fail because they did not meet their required burden of proof against the
State,109 and how California is free to be a laboratory and implement
innovative programs:110
Public policy innovations like the Standard represent the genius of federalism. They are the products of the states acting as “laboratories of democracy,”
a phenomenon noted 80 years ago in a famous dissent by Justice Louis Brandeis. To fulfill this role, the states must have room to experiment with new
solutions to new problems.”111

The states should have this latitude “through a period of ferment and
experimentation in confronting the multifaceted challenges of climate
change” even if it runs into Constitutional limitations.112
This amicus brief cited the experimental laboratory of California as
qualifying for the opening suggested, but not specifically enumerated
or sanctioned, in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, where “there is
some reason, apart from their origin, to treat [fuels] differently.”113
The Philadelphia opinion suggested in dicta that there must be some
other reason, without specifying which, that would also satisfy Constitutionally legitimacy. Trash is largely without distinguishing characteristics from one batch to another, the Philadelphia court
hypothesized, without there being any basis to distinguish another
reason for the regulation of imported waste. Similarly, CO2 and GHG
emissions from one molecule of chemically identical ethanol to the
next also are without distinction, regardless of where they are released.114 However, in subsequent opinions on the dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court opinions went further, and
explicitly stated that no environmental rationale for regulation ex108. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Environmental Law in Support of Appellants,
Rocky Mountain III, 730 F. 3d 1070 (Nos. 12–15131, 12-15135), 2012 WL
2376704.
109. Id. at 24. “Instead, a plaintiff must prove that the challenged regulation will
‘cause local goods to constitute a larger share, and goods with an out-of-state
source to constitute a smaller share, of the total sales in the market.’ ” Id. at 26
(quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 n.16 (1978)).
110. Id. at 14. Not until page 28 of the brief’s 36 pages are Constitutional issues of law
directly addressed. Id. at 28–36.
111. Id. at 1 (citing New State Ice v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
112. Id. at 8.
113. Id. at 24 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)).
114. See Energy Source Comparison, ENERGY4ME, http://energy4me.org/all-about-ener
gy/what-is-energy/energy-sources/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2015), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/L5YG-QZMX (stating simply that burning ethanol creates carbon
dioxide without making a distinction between ethanol burning sources in different geographic locations).
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cused constitutional violations based on the geographic place of origin
of the commerce.115
Ultimately, the legal issue presented is less an issue of environmental law and more an issue of constitutional law applied to an environmental statute. Another group of law professors filed an amicus
brief supporting the plaintiffs, which noted that:
CARB argues that Congress bestowed “plenary authority” on California to
regulate the production and use of transportation fuels, even in other states.
But CARB points to no clear statutory statement of congressional intent authorizing this remarkable assertion of state power. Indeed, it has not identified any instance where Congress has bestowed “plenary authority” on one
state.116

There also is judicial deference to agency decisions. In a recent
opinion, a federal court of appeals noted the great deference due to an
administrative agency in charge of implementing a standard, and
stressed that the agency had broad leeway in deciding how much of a
scientific margin of safety was sufficient.117 The court disclaimed any
role in refereeing disputes among experts, and had discretion to reassess evidence based on its own judgment.118 However, where there is
scientific evidence as a critical part of the record, such as from an advisory committee, if the agency disagrees with its advisory committee,
it “must give a sound scientific reason for its disagreement.”119 As to
whether the rationale to encourage state laboratories of environmental experimentation are exempt from constitutional prohibitions on
geographic discrimination burdening the origin of commerce embodied
115. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town
of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386, 393 (1994) (holding the “well-settled principles
of [ ] Commerce Clause jurisprudence” could not justify the challenged legislation
“as a way to steer solid waste away from out-of-town disposal sites that it might
deem harmful to the environment. To do so would extend the town’s police power
beyond its jurisdictional boundaries.”).
116. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union Appellees at 2–3, Rocky Mountain III, 730 F. 3d 1070 (No. 12–15131,
12–15135), 2012 WL 3594433.
117. Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In 2008, EPA set both the
primary and secondary ozone standards at 75 parts per billion, averaged over an
8-hour period. Id. at 1341. EPA also issued a secondary air quality standard for
ozone (designed to protect public welfare), which was the same as the primary
standard. Id. The court also stated that EPA did not have to show that old standards were wrong due to errors or new evidence, in order to modify them. Id. at
1347. The court said that EPA had failed to give a clear enough explanation for
making the secondary standard equal to the primary standard, and had failed to
state explicitly “what level of protection was ‘requisite to protect the public welfare.’” Id. at 1361–62.
118. Id. at 1361–62.
119. Id. at 1355. An independent health panel created under the Clean Air Act recommended that a more protective ozone health standard was justified. Id. at 1356.
EPA need not always be as health-protective as its scientists recommend. Id. at
1358.
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in the Commerce Clause, the professors in support of plaintiffs–appellees noted:
In light of “the important role the Commerce Clause plays in protecting the
free flow of interstate trade, th[e] Court has exempted state statutes from the
implied limitations of the Clause only when the congressional direction to do
so has been ‘unmistakably clear.’ ” “[W]hen Congress has not ‘expressly stated
its intent and policy’ to sustain state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause,” the Court has held that the judiciary “ha[s] no authority to
rewrite its legislation based on mere speculation as to what Congress ‘probably had in mind.’ ”120

The amicus brief of the Environmental Law Professors in support
of CARB and the State, appealing to discretion for California’s “genius” and “laboratories,” ultimately was on the side of the successful
parties on appeal. The Ninth Circuit majority was persuaded by California’s history of being able to experiment with regulation as a leader
among states and respecting “local autonomy,”121 observing, “[o]ur
conclusion is reinforced by the grave need in this context for state experimentation.”122 The court held that the State’s acting as an experimental laboratory justified regulation that burdened interstate
commerce.123
The decision reconfigured the thread of Supreme Court interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause.124 According to the court, a
120. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union Appellees, supra note 116, at 25 (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131,
138–39 (1986) (quoting South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S.
82, 91 (1984)); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343
(1982)).
121. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F. 3d at 1087.
122. Id. at 1097. The majority concluded by citing a dissent by Justice Brandeis to an
older Supreme Court decision which notes that states can be laboratories. Id. at
1087 (quoting New State Ice Co v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting)). The majority of the Supreme Court did not issue this statement. Id.
123. Id.
124. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383 (1994)
(“[O]rdinance is no less discriminatory because in-state or in-town processors are
also covered by the prohibition.”); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S.
186 (1994) (invalidating equal fee imposed on in-state and out-of-state commerce,
the distribution of which favored in-state commerce); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t
of Envtl Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (invalidating Oregon’s increased per-ton
surcharge on waste generated in other states); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill,
Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (invalidating the provisions of Michigan’s Solid Waste Management Act that restricted landfill’s ability
to accept out-of-state waste); Chem. Waste Mgmt, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334
(1992) (invalidating Alabama’s imposition of an additional disposal fee on hazardous waste generated outside the state but disposed of within Alabama); City
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 617 (1978) (holding that states cannot discriminate against articles of commerce originating in other states unless
there is a “reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently”); Hunt v.
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (invalidating North Carolina law prohibiting display of Washington State apple grades); Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (requiring states to choose the least
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state environmental purpose to reduce GHGs emitted in the state justified imposing restrictive regulation, burdens, and costs on interstate
commerce entering the state.125 The majority opinion determined
that carbon emission control is such an exception, when based on science.126 This reconfigured the legal calculus for state regulation of
carbon-emitting interstate commerce: the Supreme Court, however,
has held that the Constitution does not allow an environmental purpose to justify discrimination that otherwise burdens interstate commerce.127 And regardless of how and when the Supreme Court next
speaks on these issues in some future case,128 the implications for
state regulation are of note:
• Primary human-caused CO2-emitting activities are vehicle fuels,
electricity production, and agriculture,129 to which similar state
GHG limitations can also be applied to favor in-state agricultural products, electricity, gasoline or regulation of plane travel
from or to the state.
• There was a dissenting opinion: of four federal judges who ruled
on this case at the trial and appellate levels, two found it unconstitutional, while two did not.
F.

The Dissent in the Ninth Circuit

The dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit decision found there
was facial discrimination.130 Any geographic discrimination by a
state, whether along state or other geographic lines, is suspect to
strict scrutiny by the court.131 The burden is on California to demonstrate that no less burdensome regulatory incentives were available to
control GHGs, and the dissent notes that at oral argument, California
admitted that there were less burdensome alternatives on interstate
commerce than “to use lifecycle analysis to reduce GHG emissions.”132

125.
126.
127.
128.

129.
130.

131.
132.

discriminatory or intrusive means to regulate interstate commerce, when balancing local purpose against a statute which either discriminates on its face or impermissibly controls conduct outside its borders).
Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d at 1097.
Id. at 1097–1100.
West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. 186; C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. 383.
See infra subsections IV.A.1–2 (discussing alternative holdings on state energy
regulation of two other federal circuit courts of appeals in the same year of the
Ninth Circuit decision).
See infra figure accompanying note 337.
Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d at 1107 (Murguia, J., dissenting) (relying on Supreme Court decision in Chem. Waste Mgmt, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342
(1994) (noting that the “additional fee [on imported commerce] facially
discriminates”)).
See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989).
Id. at 1109.
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Even where a state statute is drafted in a fashion which is facially
neutral rather than expressly discriminatory, a court applies a strict
scrutiny standard where the state law has a discriminatory effect.133
Justice Scalia, concurring in the majority prior opinion in West Lynn
Creamery, noted that “subsidies for in-state industry . . . would clearly
be invalid under any formulation of the Court’s guiding principle” for
dormant Commerce Clause cases.134 Fees imposed on out-of-state
commerce have an identical effect to subsidies for in-state industry.
When a court evaluates such a statute using strict scrutiny, the result
is almost always that the state action is found unconstitutional.135
Below, this Article contrasts the majority and dissenting opinions
in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Rocky Mountain136 decision,
which unravels the traditional threads of constitutional
jurisprudence.
III. CAN THE NINTH CIRCUIT RECONFIGURE THE
SUPREME COURT’S CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT?
The Ninth Circuit majority opinion regarding California carbon
regulation unravels several threads of Supreme Court precedent interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution. These
altered threads will be intriguing strands of the weave as other federal circuit courts are now reaching contrarily woven decisions.137 A
half-dozen of these unraveled threads are examined below.
A.

Geographic Discrimination Is Any Geographic
Distinction, Not Only State-Versus-State Economic
Protectionism

Even where a particular state energy regulation is within state authority to enact, its substantive provisions still must be applied within
the constraints of the dormant Commerce Clause, so as not to unduly
burden interstate commerce between the states, pursuant to Article I
of the Constitution.138 The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits actions which are either facially discriminatory against, or unduly bur133. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391 (“[O]rdinance is no less discriminatory because
in-state or in-town processors are also covered by the prohibition.”); Hunt v.
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977); see also Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361
(1992) (holding that statute treating out-of-county waste the same as waste from
other states was still discriminatory).
134. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 208 (Scalia, J., concurring).
135. STEVEN FERREY, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 158 (6th ed.
2012).
136. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F. 3d 1070.
137. See infra subsections IV.A.1–2.
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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den, interstate commerce.139 This requires a dual inquiry of what is
“facial” and whether the effect is a burden which is undue.
A court first determines whether regulation or legislation is
facially discriminatory against interstate commerce, and will only uphold that law if a legitimate local purpose can be found.140 The dormant Commerce Clause precedent is “driven by concern about
‘economic protectionism––that is, regulatory measures designed to
benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.’”141 State statutes or regulation found to discriminate against
out-of-state interests based on geography or favoring local interests
are found to be per se invalid.142 If the statute is geographically evenhanded, the courts apply the Pike balancing test to determine whether
the state’s interest justifies the incidental discriminatory effect of the
regulatory mechanism as applied.143
However, while it is most common that state action benefits commerce originating in that regulating state, unlawful discrimination
need not do so to benefit the regulating state. Geographically-based
state restrictions on interstate commerce, whether discriminating for
or against local commerce, raise identical constitutional dormant
Commerce Clause concerns.144 Even a small discriminatory impact
can be stricken under a strict scrutiny standard of review, and the
magnitude of impermissible discriminatory impact can be minor.145 A
discriminatory Oklahoma statute—involving regulation of energy fuels similar to the LCFS regulation—was overturned pursuant to the
dormant Commerce Clause even though it resulted in only a relatively
minor 3%–7% allocation of the market to in-state producers.146
139. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (citing Or. Waste Sys.,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
140. See Davis, 553 U.S. at 338.
141. Id. at 337–38 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74
(1988)); see Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99.
142. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997); City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (noting that if a statute is facially discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid); see also Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 33,
59 (2009) (mentioning history of the dormant Commerce Clause).
143. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (explaining the balancing test for when a statute “regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental”).
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
145. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270, 272 (1984) (finding that a
tax exemption for certain locally produced alcoholic beverages violated the dormant Commerce Clause even though the state’s asserted purpose for the tax was
otherwise). “A finding that state legislation constitutes ‘economic protectionism’
may be made on the basis of either discriminatory purpose, or discriminatory
effect.” Id. at 270 (citation omitted).
146. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455 (1992). As a result of the statute, the
market changed in response from use of almost all out-of-state coal to “the utili-
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The Supreme Court has held that statutes which establish regional
barriers (not necessarily just a one-state barrier) and discriminate
only against some states rather than all states, violate the Commerce
Clause.147 Any regulation which distinguishes on any place of origin
of the commerce is subject to strict scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause. Subsidies of in-state commerce or businesses, even if
the burdens to achieve the subsidies are imposed on all commerce regardless of its origin, are stricken under strict scrutiny review.148
Even where a statute is drafted in a fashion which is facially neutral rather than expressly discriminatory, a court applies a strict scrutiny standard where the state law has a discriminatory purpose or
effect.149 The majority opinion of the Ninth Circuit only engages in an
examination of whether one state elects to regulate in a way which
discriminates against another state. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that state regulation does not need to “be drafted explicitly
along state lines in order to demonstrate its discriminatory design.”150
Any geographic discrimination by a state, whether along state or other
geographic lines, is subject to strict scrutiny by the courts, which the
Ninth Circuit dissent noted.151

147.
148.

149.

150.

151.

ties purchased [in-state] Oklahoma coal in amounts ranging from 3.4% to 7.4% of
their annual needs, with a necessarily corresponding reduction in purchases of
Wyoming coal.” Id.; see also Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 596
(7th Cir. 1995) (finding that even though the statute did not compel use of Illinois
coal or forbid use of out-of-state coal, by encouraging use of Illinois coal it “discriminate[d] against western coal by making it a less viable compliance option for
Illinois generating plants”).
See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
Alliance for Clean Coal, 44 F.3d at 595–96 (noting the importance of “ ‘the need to
use coal mined in Illinois’ and ‘the need to maintain and preserve as a valuable
State resource the mining of coal in Illinois’ ” and concluding that the Illinois Coal
Act, like the . . . order in West Lynn, has the same effect as a ‘tariff or customs
duty—neutralizing the advantage possessed by lower cost out of state producers’”); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994)
(“[O]rdinance is no less discriminatory because in-state or in-town processors are
also covered by the prohibition.”); Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53; see also Fort Gratiot
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992)
(“In view of the fact that Michigan has not identified any reason, apart from its
origin, why solid waste coming from outside the county should be treated differently from solid waste within the county, the foregoing reasoning would appear to
control the disposition of this case.”).
Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Amerada Hess
Corp. v. N.J. Dept. of Treasury, 490 U.S. 66, 76 (1989)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2884 (2014). See also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc., 504 U.S. at 353 (striking ordinance banning disposal of out-of-county waste); C & A Carbone, Inc., 511
U.S. at 391 (1984) (striking local trash processing requirement); Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (striking ordinance requiring milk to be
processed within five miles of town).
Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d at 1108 (Murguia, J. dissenting) (quoting Or.
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t Env’t. Quality of Envt’l Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100 (1994)).
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An additional requirement imposed by Supreme Court precedent is
a determination of whether the state has met an obligation to choose
the least burdensome option in its regulation.
B.

The Least Burdensome State Regulatory Choice?

The Supreme Court held that an agency of government cannot discriminate against interstate commerce “if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are
available.”152 For such a statute or regulation to be upheld, the state
usually must sustain a burden of establishing that there is a compelling state interest for which the statute is the least intrusive means to
achieve that interest.153 The State must demonstrate that no less
burdensome regulatory options were available to control GHGs. The
dissent in Rocky Mountain noted that California admitted that means
less burdensome on interstate commerce existed “to use lifecycle analysis to reduce GHG emissions,” and California had not taken them.154
C.

The Lack of Local Impact of GHG Emissions

The Ninth Circuit majority opinion held that a scientific basis establishing GHG impact on climate changed the constitutional analysis
for the court.155 Repeatedly, the court majority relied on the finding
that California has an interest in limiting the effects on California of
GHGs associated with products consumed in California, regardless of
their origin. The Ninth Circuit majority in Rocky Mountain held that
the impact in the state justified state regulation and did not examine
the impact of CO2 or methane emissions on the state citizenry compared to any other citizens in the U.S. “[W]e . . . allow California to
protect its land and citizens based on a realistic assessment of
threats.”156
However, global warming and climate change emissions in California have no particularized or distinct impact in or on California or its
particular citizens.157 Ethanol is chemically identical regardless of
the state in which it is produced.158 If one is to elevate the role of
science to justify a particular judicial result, all aspects of that science
are relevant. The location of GHG emission has no additional net impact on climate change in that particular location. A molecule of GHG
152. Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 354.
153. Stiles, supra note 142, at 58–59.
154. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d at 1109 (Murguia, J., dissenting) (referring to hearing transcript).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1097.
157. See FERREY, supra note 5, at 6.
158. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d at 1088.
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released anywhere in the world has an identical impact on climate
change, as pointed out by experts in their brief to the Ninth Circuit.159
D.

Elevating Environmental Rationale to Sanction
Geographic Discrimination

The Ninth Circuit majority held that it is defensible to discriminate through in-state regulation based on (1) the average carbon intensity of electricity generation in the region where the good is
produced and (2) the distance that the good travels from its place of
origin to its use in state.160 Therefore, where goods must be transported using fossil fuels, a state can choose to regulate GHG emissions
in a manner that burdens out-of-state goods because of their distance
of transportation in interstate commerce. The majority also allowed
state discrimination regarding identical finished goods or commodities
because of the carbon intensity of regional electricity that must be
used to produce an item and the transportation fuel used to move commerce from one state to the next.161
The court construed Philadelphia v. New Jersey,162 the touchstone
Supreme Court decision striking down discriminatory treatment of
out-of-state commerce in waste commodities based on their out-ofstate origin, to now allow a distinction based on the length of interstate travel from the point of origin to consumers in California. The
Ninth Circuit majority found indirect support implied in the Supreme
Court opinions in Oregon Waste163 and Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. Hunt164 to allow license where there is imposition of “higher
costs” on the receiving state.165 However, as set forth immediately
above, there is no distinct local impact with any GHG emissions,166
and as discussed in detail below, this rationale would alter Supreme
Court precedent regarding the Commerce Clause.167
There is no more impact on climate change from commerce arriving in California or commerce arriving in a nearby state.168 However,
159. See Brief of Amici Curiae Ken Caldeira, Ph.D., et al. in Support of DefendantsAppellants at 27, Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070 (Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135),
2012 WL 2376705 (“Greenhouse gas emissions contribute to the problem of global
climate change wherever they are emitted.”). The majority opinion of the Ninth
Circuit concedes that “[o]ne ton of carbon dioxide emitted when fuel is produced
in Iowa or Brazil harms Californians as much as one emitted when fuel is consumed in Sacramento.” Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d at 1081.
160. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070.
161. Id. at 1091–92.
162. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–28 (1978).
163. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
164. 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
165. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d at 1089–90.
166. See supra section III.C.
167. See discussion infra Part V.
168. See supra section III.C.
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the Ninth Circuit majority focused on the electricity inputs needed to
produce the ethanol and the transportation inputs needed to move
that commerce across state lines in order to distinguish its regulatory
treatment of identical fuels. “[I]f an out-of-state ethanol pathway does
impose higher costs on California by virtue of its greater [transportation] GHG emissions, there is a nondiscriminatory reason for its
higher carbon intensity value. . . . [B]ecause they use dirtier electricity . . . CARB can base its regulatory treatment on these [upstream,
out-of-California] emissions.”169
The majority decision makes interstate transportation of any good
in commerce a negative factor on climate change and thereby justifies
state regulation of any and all interstate commerce.170 The Supreme
Court, applying the dormant Commerce Clause, has never reached
such a conclusion. The scope of commerce among the states for purposes of a dormant Commerce Clause analysis is broadly defined,171
and all objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection.172 There is no indication in any Supreme Court precedent that
environmental issues are an avenue to negate application of the dormant Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has noted: “even if environmental preservation were the central purpose of the pricing order,
that would not be sufficient to uphold a discriminatory regulation.”173
The Ninth Circuit majority sidestepped the Supreme Court’s precedent in West Lynn.174

169. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d at 1089–90.
170. See discussion infra Part V (applying this legal rationale to waste, electricity,
food, and airline travel).
171. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (invalidating Oregon’s increased per-ton surcharge on waste generated in other states);
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep’t. of Natural Res., 504 U.S.
353 (1992) (invalidating the provisions of Michigan’s Solid Waste Management
Act that restricted landfill’s ability to accept out-of-state waste); Chem. Waste
Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (invalidating Alabama’s imposition of an additional disposal fee on hazardous waste generated outside the state but disposed
of within Alabama); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621–22
(1978) (holding that a state cannot discriminate against articles of commerce
originating in other states unless there is a “reason, apart from their origin, to
treat them differently” (emphasis added)).
172. See cases cited supra note 171. See also New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 16 (2002) (finding transmissions on the interconnected national grids constitute transmissions in interstate commerce).
173. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204 & n.20 (1994).
174. Id.
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Prior California Precedent on Environmental Rationale
Is Ignored

In recently defending another new sustainable-energy program,175
California made an argument analogous to one it made before the
Ninth Circuit in Rocky Mountain: past constitutional precedent no
longer applies if California is addressing global warming. After enacting a feed-in tariff requiring California state utilities to make wholesale power purchases at well in excess of wholesale rates for power
and in excess of allowed “avoided costs” under the PURPA Amendments to the Federal Power Act,176 California raised the same “environmental purpose” justification that it argued again in the Ninth
Circuit LCFS dispute before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC): that an environmental regulatory purpose should make
California exempt from past interpretations of constitutional
precedent.177
The plaintiffs in this 2010–2011 energy regulatory matter countered that federal law does not allow state regulations to violate the
Constitution in order to achieve state environmental goals.178 FERC
rejected all of California’s arguments regarding generic environmental
rationales for exemption.179 FERC found that a new GHG environmental motive for California’s regulation did not alter precedent interpreting the law.180
There are multiple federal precedents in the last two decades construing California energy regulation. In Independent Energy Producers Association,181 the Ninth Circuit found California’s authority over
energy in commerce preempted.182 In Southern California Edison
Company,183 FERC blocked California action conflicting with federal
decisions on energy commerce. The Supreme Court held that Congress meant to draw a “bright line,” easily ascertained and not requiring case-by-case analysis, between California and federal
jurisdiction.184 When a transaction is subject to exclusive federal
175. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2010) (Order on Petitions for Declaratory Order).
176. 16 U.S.C. § 824a (2012).
177. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047.
178. Id.
179. Id. at ¶ 61,337 (“The Commission’s authority under the [Federal Power Act] includes the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the rates, terms and conditions of
sales for resale of electric energy in interstate commerce by public utilities.”).
FERC granted a request for clarification: Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n., 133 FERC ¶
61,059 (2010) (Order Granting Clarification and Dismissing Rehearing).
180. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n., 133 FERC ¶ 61,059.
181. Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, Inc. v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 848 (9th
Cir. 1994).
182. Id. at 853.
183. S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 FERC ¶ 61,215 (1995).
184. Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964).
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FERC jurisdiction, state regulation is preempted as a matter of federal law and the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, according to a
long-standing and consistent line of rulings by the Supreme Court.185
When states do not observe these constitutional limitations, state
taxpayers can be left paying for challengers’ multiple millions of dollars of legal costs of successful challenge.186 The Supreme Court in
1986,187 and again in 1988,188 2003,189 and 2008,190 reaffirmed and
enforced restrictions on state decisions that changed the price of energy in interstate commerce. Of note, the most recent of these four
cases came out of the Ninth Circuit.191 While this decision proceeded
on appeal to the Supreme Court192 and thereafter was remanded to
FERC for more clarification,193 this ruling against California’s market
185. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982). The Supreme
Court overturned an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission
that restrained within the state, for the financial advantage of in-state ratepayers, low-cost hydroelectric energy produced within the state. It held this to be an
impermissible violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and the Federal Power
Act. “Our cases consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution . . . precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located
within its borders or to the products derived therefrom.” Id. at 338. See also
Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 50 (2003) (LPSC’s “second-guessing of the classification of ERS units is pre-empted”); Miss. Power &
Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988) (concluding proceedings by a state commission are pre-empted by FERC); Nantahala Power & Light
Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986) (holding that the North Carolina Utilities
Commission’s allocation of entitlement is pre-empted by federal law); Montana–
Dakota Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951) (“[T]he prescription of
the statute is a standard for the Commission to apply and, independently of Commission action, creates no right which courts may enforce.”).
186. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Vt. 2012)
(Order on the merits of complaint, reversed on appeal), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013). Similar request for fees are pending for plaintiffs’
constitutional challenges in cases in California, New Jersey, and Maryland. See
PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790 (D. Md. 2013), aff’d, 753
F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014) (field preemption and conflict preemption on wholesale
power prices); PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372
(D.N.J. 2013), aff’d, PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 2014 WL 4454999 (3d Cir.
2014) (field preemption on wholesale power prices and rates); Planning and Conservation League v. California, No. RG 12626904 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2013)
(Motion for attorney fees).
187. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986).
188. Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. 354.
189. Entergy La., 539 U.S. 39.
190. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527 (2008).
191. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 471 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.
2006).
192. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., 554 U.S. at 527.
193. P.U.D. No. 1 and Morgan Stanley remanded the case to the FERC. See Morgan
Stanley Capital Grp., 554 U.S. at 527; P.U.D. No. 1, 471 F.3d at 1053.
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regulation rendered by the Ninth Circuit was not substantively overturned when before the Supreme Court.194
F.

No Facial Discrimination?
1.

What Is Facial

The Ninth Circuit majority in the LCFS matter concluded that
“California’s regulatory experiment seeking to decrease GHG emissions and create a market that recognizes the harmful costs of products with a high carbon intensity does not facially discriminate
against out-of-state ethanol.”195 The dissent in the Ninth Circuit case
found facial discrimination, relying on Supreme Court precedent in
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt.196 “The State’s burden of
justification is so heavy that ‘facial discrimination by itself may be a
fatal defect.’”197 A challenge is facial, as opposed to as applied, “when
the ‘claim and the relief that would follow . . . reach beyond the particular circumstances’ of the plaintiffs.”198 And with GHG emissions,
there is no doubt that the “claim and the relief that would follow . . .
reach beyond the particular circumstances of the plaintiffs”199 and affects a broad group.
If the statute is geographically evenhanded, the courts apply the
Pike balancing test, rather than strict scrutiny, to determine whether
the State’s interest justifies the incidental discriminatory effect of the
regulatory mechanism as applied.200 And even without facial discrimination or any geographic purpose or effect, certain regulations will
still fail even the balancing test.
A facially neutral statute that imposes an incidental “burden on
interstate commerce incommensurate with the local benefits secured”201 would fail the balancing test articulated by the Supreme
194. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964).
195. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2884 (2014).
196. Id. at 1108 (“[T]he ‘additional fee [on imported commerce] facially discriminates.’” (quoting Chem. Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. Hunt 504 U.S. 334, at 334 (1994))).
197. Id. at 1109 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S.
93, 101 (1994)).
198. Rocky Mountain II, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Doe v.
Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 187), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014).
199. Id.
200. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (When a statute “regulates
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.”).
201. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2013).

838

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:807

Court in Pike.202 A statute or regulation would discriminate against
commerce itself when the statute:
(i) shifts the costs of regulation onto other states, permitting in-state
lawmakers to avoid the costs of their political decisions, (ii) has the practical
effect of requiring out-of-state commerce to be conducted at the regulating
state’s direction, or (iii) alters the interstate flow of the goods in question, as
distinct from the impact on companies trading in those goods.203

While states have broad authority under their inherent police powers, a dormant Commerce Clause violation “is not to be avoided by
‘simply invoking the convenient apologetics of the police power.’ ”204 A
geographically discriminatory impact does not require express mention of geography in the regulation, and a regulation may appear neutral but have a geographically direct or indirect impact on commerce.
“Such a [contrary] view, we have noted, ‘would mean that the Commerce Clause of itself imposes no limitations on state action . . . save
for the rare instance where a state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate goods.”205
State statutes or regulations found to discriminate against out-ofstate interests based on geography or favoring local interests, are per
se invalid.206 Subsidy of in-state businesses, even if the taxes to raise
the subsidies are imposed on all commerce, can be stricken under
strict scrutiny.207 A limited exception occurs when a state participates directly in the market as a purchaser, seller, or producer of articles of commerce.208 However, this exception does not apply to state
regulation of private companies, as is present with California carbon
regulation in A.B. 32.
202. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
203. Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
204. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 780 (1945) (quoting Kan. City
S. Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 233 U.S. 75 (1914); Buck v. Kuykendall,
267 U.S. 307, 315 (1925)).
205. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (quoting
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951)).
206. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338–39 (2008); Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (noting that if a statute is facially discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid); Stiles, supra note 142, at 60–61.
207. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994); Alliance for Clean Coal
v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Illinois Coal Act, like
the . . . order in West Lynn, has the same effect as a ‘tariff or customs duty—
neutralizing the advantage possessed by lower cost out of state producers.’ ”
(quoting West Lynn, 512 U.S. at 194)).
208. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970));
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
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The Ninth Circuit Rocky Mountain dissent noted that where there
is facial discrimination, Supreme Court precedent does not permit a
court to look at the “purpose of, or justification for, a law,” and a court
looks only at differential treatment of economic interests.209 However, even when there is no obvious or overt facial discrimination
against out-of-state or other geographically based interests, where the
effect or purpose is to discriminate the ultimate impact is enough to
make the regulation unconstitutional.210 Even where a statute is
drafted in a fashion that is facially neutral rather than expressly discriminatory, a court can apply a strict scrutiny standard where the
purpose or effect of a state law has a discriminatory effect.211 For example, if a statute does not mention, or in any other way distinguish,
the geographic location of the commerce, but uses terms that result in
a geographic preference, a court can apply a strict scrutiny standard.
The trial court in the Rocky Mountain case noted that a regulation
need not facially mention discriminatory provisions against out-ofstate entrants to be held in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause.212 A regulation that “evinces” discriminatory purpose against
interstate commerce “or unambiguously discriminates in its effect . . . almost always is ‘invalid per se.’ ”213
209. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070, 1108 (9th Cir. 2013) (Murguia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99–100
(1994)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014).
210. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Hunt v. Wash. State
Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
211. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391 (“[O]rdinance is no less discriminatory because
in-state or in-town processors are also covered by the prohibition.”); S.–Cent.
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984) (“[T]he Court has viewed
with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere.
Even where the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal.” (quoting
Pike, 397 U.S. at 143)); Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53; see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992) (concluding
that because Michigan failed to identify a reason “why solid waste coming from
outside the county should be treated differently from solid waste within the
county, the foregoing reasoning would appear to control the disposition of this
case”).
212. Rocky Mountain II, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“[L]egislation
favoring in-state economic interests is facially invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause, even when such legislation also burdens some in-state interests or
includes some out-of-state interests in the favored classification.” (quoting Daghlian v. DeVry Univ., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243 (C.D. Cal. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey,
730 F.3d 1070, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014).
213. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 209 (2d Cir. 2003)
(quoting Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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Note here, that this standard is in the disjunctive: Either discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect is subject to strict scrutiny,
rendering such regulations very unlikely to survive constitutional
scrutiny. The amount of discriminatory effect does not matter: Even a
small or incidental discriminatory impact can be stricken under strict
scrutiny constitutional review.214
Even where a statute is drafted in a fashion that is facially neutral
rather than expressly discriminatory, a court applies a strict scrutiny
standard where the state law has a discriminatory effect.215 A state
cannot regulate to favor, or require use of, its own in-state energy resources,216 nor can it, by regulation, harbor energy-related resources
originating in the state.217 In-state fuels cannot be required to be
used by a state even for the rationale of satisfying federal Clean Air
Act requirements.218 Income tax credits cannot be given by a state
only to in-state producers of fuel additives.219 The Supreme Court
consistently has required that the regulation of power by the states
must not discriminate regarding the origin of power or the ultimate
impact, which may discourage its flow in interstate commerce:
[We] consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution . . .
precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right
of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within its
borders or to the products derived therefrom. . . . [A] “State is without power
to prevent privately owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in
interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local demands or because they are needed by the people of the State.”220

Recent federal court opinions construing state energy regulation have
scrupulously followed this doctrine.221
214. See Bacchus Imp., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) (“A finding that state
legislation constitutes ‘economic protectionism’ may be made on the basis of either discriminatory purpose . . . or discriminatory effect.”).
215. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391 (“[O]rdinance is no less discriminatory because
in-state or in-town processors are also covered by the prohibition.”); Fort Gratiot,
504 U.S. at 361; Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53.
216. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–56 (1992); Alliance for Clean Coal v.
Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993), aff’d sub nom. Alliance for Clean
Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995).
217. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982).
218. Alliance for Clean Coal, 44 F.3d at 596–97.
219. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 278–80 (1988).
220. New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338 (1982) (quoting Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928)) (overturning as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause an order of the state Public Utilities Commission that
restrained renewable power produced within the state within the state for the
financial advantage of in-state ratepayers).
221. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Vt. 2012),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013).
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Or Discriminatory Legislative Purpose

A geographically discriminatory purpose also is impermissible. A
regulation need not facially mention discrimination against out-ofstate entrants to violate the dormant Commerce Clause.222 A regulation which evinces discriminatory purpose against interstate commerce, “or unambiguously discriminates in its effect . . . almost always
is ‘invalid per se.’ ”223 Even where a statute is drafted in a fashion
that is facially neutral rather than expressly discriminatory, for example by not mentioning the geographic location of the commerce but
otherwise using other terms that result in a geographic preference, a
court can apply a strict scrutiny standard where the state law has a
discriminatory effect.224
CARB explicitly stated that one of its goals is to “ensure that a
significant portion of the biofuels used in the LCFS are produced in
California” so as to keep money in the state.225 The Ninth Circuit
majority did not find this dispositive:226 “We will ‘assume that the
objectives articulated by the legislature are actual purposes of the
statute, unless an examination of the circumstances forces us to con222. See discussion supra subsection III.F.1. See also Rocky Mountain III, 843 F.
Supp. 2d 1071, 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“[L]egislation favoring in-state economic
interests is facially invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause, even when
such legislation also burdens some in-state interests or includes some out-of-state
interests in the favored classification.” (quoting Daghlian v. DeVry Univ., 582 F.
Supp. 2d 1231, 1243 (C.D. Cal. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), rev’d
sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014).
223. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 209 (2d Cir. 2003)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 108
(2d Cir. 2001)).
224. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994); S.–Cent.
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 145 (1984) (“[T]he Court has viewed
with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere.
Even where the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal.” (quoting
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970)); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977); see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992) (concluding
that because Michigan failed to identify a reason “why solid waste coming from
outside the county should be treated differently from solid waste within the
county, the foregoing reasoning would appear to control the disposition of this
case”).
225. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union Appellees, supra note 116, at 24 n.4 (noting that the anticipated
“[d]isplac[ement of] imported transportation fuels with biofuels produced in the
State keeps more money in the State”).
226. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070.
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clude that they could not have been a goal of the legislation.’ ”227 The
majority was sheltered in a Supreme Court holding thirty years ago in
a prior California matter regarding energy, which found that the
stated purpose of a state law or regulation is taken by the court verbatim as the true purpose, without parsing further into actual evidence
of real purpose.228
Under such a PG&E as-written-only test, the role of state counsel
instructing state officials to be careful in what they say can determine
which side prevails in a challenge. This purpose can be critical in determining whether Philadelphia strict scrutiny applies in court review, or whether a Pike balancing test applies. Strict scrutiny is
virtually always fatal to justification of the state regulation;229 a balancing approach is not.230 Are state declarations of legislative purpose taken verbatim by the courts as the true purpose, or do courts
determine the actual purpose from a more complete examination of
the record and evidence?
A closer examination of how the Supreme Court and other federal
courts have regarded the PG&E precedent is illuminating. In the
three decades after its issuance in 1983 through 2012, the Supreme
Court’s precedent in PG&E was cited 929 times by federal courts and
agencies, including in twenty-eight cases by the Supreme Court, in
235 cases by federal circuit courts of appeals, in 537 cases by federal
trial courts, and in twelve administrative determinations by FERC.231
However, the critical holding regarding how to determine legislative
purpose has not been primarily cited or relied on by the federal judiciary. Of the total 929 federal opinions over three decades citing the
1983 PG&E opinion, only fifty-five—approximately 5%—have cited
this particular legislative purpose holding at all, including in three
subsequent cases by the Supreme Court, twenty-one cases by federal
circuit courts, and thirty-one cases by federal trial courts. Of these
fifty-five citations, most cite this holding either in dicta or only as a
very general reference to the mechanics of the preemption doctrine.232
Of the remaining few opinions which construe this “legislative purpose” holding at any level of depth or application, many examine facts
behind the stated purpose in the preamble of the construed legisla227. Id. at 1097–98 (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 463
n.7 (1981)).
228. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 216 (1983).
229. FERREY, supra note 135.
230. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456; FERREY, supra note 135, at 158–61.
231. See, e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 80 (1990); Pennsylvania v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 684 F. Supp. 2d 564, 584 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
232. See, e.g., Ishikawa v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 343 F.3d 1129, 1134 n.22 (9th Cir.
2003); Crystal Bay Marina v. Sweeden, 939 F. Supp. 839, 841 (N.D. Okla. 1996);
Snow v. Bechtel Constr. Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1517, 1519 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
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tion, the effect it has on Congress’ ability to carry out its objectives,233
and whether the stated purpose is “merely a cover-up” for prohibited
state actions.234 Very few subsequent federal court decisions have invoked or followed the holding from the 1983 Supreme Court decision
in PG&E to the effect that the language in a piece of legislation is the
final authority as to ascertaining the actual purpose of that legislation.235 The Supreme Court has cited this particular part of its holding from the PG&E opinion three times in the past three decades, and
in the most recent case, the Court took a contrary position and refused
to rely solely on the stated purpose in legislation to determine whether
a state action was preempted.236
In a similar issue in a Vermont case recently decided by the Second
Circuit, the Vermont attorney general cited the Supreme Court PG&E
precedent:237 “Therefore, we accept California’s avowed economic purpose as the rationale for enacting [the moratorium].”238 However, the
federal trial court agreed with the challenger’s assertion that true
purposes must always be deduced from all of the evidence and not just
legislative preambles to regulation or law, which may be manipulated
for legislative purposes239:
233. See, e.g., Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1561 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that
a state legislative action was preempted by federal law because it had “the actual
effect of frustrating Congress’ intent” even though “the professed motivation” for
the state’s action was “the economic and environmental effects of nuclear waste
disposal”).
234. Drnek v. Chicago, 192 F. Supp. 2d 835, 844–45 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (distinguishing the
applicability of the holding in PG&E to the Atomic Energy Act with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
235. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 335 (4th Cir.
2001) (discriminatory purpose based on the legislative history of statute and
statements of those involved), cert. denied sub nom. Murphy v. Waste Mgmt.
Holdings, 535 U.S. 904 (2002); Norris v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 881 F.2d
1144, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989).
236. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 105 (1992) (“In assessing
the impact of a state law on the federal scheme, we have refused to rely solely on
the legislature’s professed purpose and have looked as well to the effects of the
law.”); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 73 (1990) (holding that field preemption did not apply to the state tort law at issue because that law was not
motivated by safety concerns and the actual effect of the law on Congress’ objectives was “not sufficiently direct and substantial”); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 249 (1984) (finding that the federal pre-emption of state regulation of the safety aspects of nuclear energy does not extend to a state-authorized award of punitive damages for conduct related to radiation hazards).
237. Olga Peters, Entergy v. Vermont Trial Concludes, VTDIGGER (Sept. 15, 2011,
10:00 PM), http://vtdigger.org/2011/09/15/entergy-v-vermont-trial-concludes
.http://vtdigger.org/2011/09/15/entergy-v-vermont-trial-concludes/, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/EMR2-3BAE.
238. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 216 (1983).
239. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 224 (D. Vt.
2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013).
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The Second Circuit has held that courts cannot “blindly accept” a challenged
statute’s “articulated purpose,” because doing so would enable legislatures to
“nullify nearly all unwanted federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative committee report articulating some state interest or policy—other than
frustration of the federal objective—that would be tangentially furthered by
the proposed state law.”240

On appeal, the Second Circuit recently upheld this decision of the
trial court to examine the entire record, rather than only the state
defendant’s stated purpose.241 The dissent by Judge Murguia, among
the judges hearing the Ninth Circuit case, found that the district
judge was correct that the California LCFS facially discriminated
against interstate commerce.242
4.

Extraterritorial Reach of One State’s Regulatory Power

The Ninth Circuit also reversed the trial court holding that California had acted to influence commerce beyond state boundaries.243
a.

Beyond the Police Power

States cannot regulate in ways where the practical effect is to control conduct in other states.244 States are prohibited from attaching
restrictions to any goods that they import from other states: “States
and localities may not attach restrictions to . . . imports in order to
control commerce in other States.”245 Where a state statute provided
a tax exemption for sales of two types of wine, both produced from
products produced in the state, even though not needing to mention
the state by name, the effect was practically state-specific discrimination, and it was found to be discriminatory and a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.246 A state cannot regulate to favor or
240. Id. (quoting Greater N.Y. Metro. Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, 195 F.3d 100, 108
(2d Cir. 1999)); accord Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 278 (1977); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 262 n.8 (1977) (zoning and the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause);
Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1247–48 (10th
Cir. 2004) (discussing state regulation of nuclear materials).
241. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, 733 F.3d 393.
242. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070, 1108 (9th Cir. 2013) (Murguia, J. dissenting),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014).
243. Id. at 1107.
244. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994); Healy
v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1984).
245. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393.
246. Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Diaz, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); see also C & A Carbone, 511
U.S. at 393 (states cannot regulate outside their own jurisdiction, even if only
indirect impacts are imposed, because of limits on local police powers beyond
their jurisdiction).
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require use of its own in-state energy resources,247 nor can it, by regulation, harbor energy-related resources originating in the state.248
“While a State may seek lower prices for its consumers, it may not
insist that producers or consumers in other States surrender whatever
competitive advantages they may possess.”249 Income tax credits cannot be given by a state only to in-state producers of fuel additives.250
In-state fuels cannot be required to be used by a state even for the
rationale of satisfying federal Clean Air Act requirements.251 A state
cannot steer commerce—even its own commerce—in a particular directions for environmental purposes, as “[t]o do so would extend the
town’s police power beyond its jurisdictional bounds.”252
b.

Balkanization

Widespread state adoption of similar regulation of GHGs based on
individual state preferences or idiosyncrasies would impermissibly
burden, or in its varying standards would interfere with, interstate
trade. “If each State imposed flat taxes for the privilege of making
commercial entrances into its territory, there is no conceivable doubt
that commerce among the States would be deterred.”253 The trial
court held that allowing California’s regulation would encourage other
states to enact their own idiosyncratic legislation resulting in economic “Balkanization.”254 The majority of the Ninth Circuit did not
directly contradict this, but instead held that it did not have to assume
such a result unless another state had taken such action or the threat
was imminent: “Plaintiffs must either present evidence that conflicting, legitimate legislation is already in place or that the threat of such
legislation is both actual and imminent.”255
Today, there is no other state regulating all GHG emissions for all
major sectors, as is California. The RGGI carbon regulatory system
247. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–56 (1992); Alliance for Clean Coal v.
Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993), aff’d sub nom. Alliance for Clean
Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995).
248. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982).
249. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582
(1986); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935) (holding
that one state “has no power to project its legislation into [another state] by regulating the price to be paid in that state for [products] acquired there”).
250. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 278–80 (1988).
251. Alliance for Clean Coal, 44 F.3d at 596–97.
252. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994).
253. American Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 284 (1987).
254. Rocky Mountain II, 843 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1092–93 (E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d sub nom.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1105 (9th Cir. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014).
255. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d at 1105 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting S.D. Myers v. City
of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 469–70 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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only regulates CO2 and only from larger power generation facilities.256
Efforts to regulate carbon in western states and separate efforts to do
so in the Midwest have been abandoned.257 However, the dissent in
the Ninth Circuit opinion noted that Oregon is already moving ahead
on LCFS regulation, without paralleling the regulatory scheme in California.258 “States and localities may not attach restrictions to exports
or imports in order to control commerce in other States.”259
The Ninth Circuit majority found that fuel standards or regulations based on another basis than mere state boundaries, and regulating only the commodity traded within the regulating state, based on
precedent from state regulation of ATM fees, rendered the in-state
preference a “neutral factor in economic decision making” and were
exempt from consideration as Balkanizing.260 “Here, California properly based its regulation on the harmful properties of fuel.”261 The
court allowed California to “assume legal and political responsibility
for emissions of carbon resulting from the production and transport,
regardless of location,” of products used in California.262 The appellate court majority in Rocky Mountain stated that “[t]he Commerce
Clause does not protect Plaintiffs’ ability to make others pay for the
hidden harms of their products merely because those products are
shipped across state lines.”263
In sum, regardless of the cleverness of how discrimination is
achieved or whether it is obvious or latent, “[t]he commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious. In each case it is
our duty to determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its
name may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination
against interstate commerce.”264

256. FERREY, supra note 5, at 80.
257. Id. at 104–106.
258. THE GOVERNOR’S CLIMATE CHANGE INTEGRATION GRP., FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR: A FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING RAPID CLIMATE CHANGE (2008), archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/BZP4-XZY5.
259. C &A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994) (citing
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. at 511 (1935)).
260. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d at 1105.
261. Id. at 1104.
262. Id. at 1105.
263. Id. at 1106.
264. Best & Co., Inc. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455–56 (1940).
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IV. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT-CHANGING
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DECISION GOING FORWARD
A.

A ‘Virtual’ Split in the Circuits?

There is a fascinating split of opinion among three different federal
circuit courts of appeals, all rendering decisions at the same point in
mid-2013, and each adjudicating different cases involving state-versus-federal authority to regulate aspects of energy. While the nuances
of each decision are examined below, the split in these circuits is of
particular note not only for the energy issues presented, but for the
rules of decision applied and whether or not there was dissent either
to the circuit court decision or a contrary decision in the federal trial
court:
• In 2013, the Seventh Circuit unanimously declared that it is a
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause for a state to treat or
subsidize renewable power originating in state more favorably
or differently than out-of-state renewable power.265
• In 2013, the Second Circuit unanimously agreed that it is unconstitutional for a state to regulate low-carbon power in a manner
restricting its ability to freely enter interstate commerce across
state lines, affirming the federal trial court in substantial
part.266
• In 2013, the Ninth Circuit upheld California’s differential treatment of renewable energy fuels based on the distance of travel
and the type of nonrenewable electricity used in its out-of-state
creation, with a dissent as well as a contrary opinion in the trial
court.267
These three contemporaneous 2013 circuit court decisions, while
not deciding identical issues, all construe either the dormant Commerce Clause, Supremacy Clause, or both, with respect to state regulation of sustainable energy investments or infrastructure. While the
states and their statutes are distinct, the constitutional principles applied are identical. And thus, they create a significant difference, or
“virtual split,” in interpretation of constitutional federalism on the
regulation of energy.
265. Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir.
2013), cert. denied sub nom. Schuette v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 134 S.
Ct. 1277 (2014); Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1278 (2014).
266. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013).
267. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070.
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The Seventh Circuit’s Unanimous Decision on
Unconstitutional State Energy Discrimination Against
Out-of-State Energy

Let’s start with the Seventh Circuit. Regarding credits afforded to
and applied to in-state renewable power and denied to out-of-state renewable power sold in commerce in the state, the Seventh Circuit held
that such state preferences or restrictions favoring in-state power
were unconstitutional.268 Judge Richard Posner, speaking for the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in a unanimous decision, affirmed
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s approval of the Midwest
Independent Service Operator’s (MISO)269 proportionate customer allocation of transmission costs for high-voltage transmission lines to
move renewable wind power to populated areas.270 For authority for
its holding on the respective jurisdiction of state and federalgulate
electricity, the opinion relied on a 2013 law review article on constitutional energy issues written by the Author.271 The Seventh Circuit
declared unconstitutional state regulation limiting state renewable
portfolio standards to in-state generation as a violation of the Commerce Clause: “[it] trips over an insurmountable constitutional objection. Michigan cannot, without violating the commerce clause of
Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy.”272
The Seventh Circuit opinion involved Michigan’s discriminating
against out-of-state renewable energy for no reason other than that
the law did so, while California’s LCFS in A.B. 32 accomplished the
same out-of-state discrimination, but based it on reflecting lifecycle
GHG emissions. Neither the Seventh Circuit,273 the Second Circuit,274 or the Supreme Court275 have made this next major step. Jus268. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 721 F.3d at 776.
269. MISO’s service area extends from the Canadian border, east to Michigan and
parts of Indiana, south to northern Missouri, and west to eastern areas of Montana. Id. at 769–70 fig.1.
270. Id. at 776. MISO allocated the costs of the transmission projects among all of the
utilities that drew power from the MISO grid in proportion to each utilities’ overall volume of usage; FERC approved MISO’s rate design, which led some states to
initiate court appeal. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. Michigan actually initiated the issue of in-state electric power discrimination
in its RPS program as an argument that out-of-state power transmitted to it was
not recognized as of the same value as in-state electricity, therefore Michigan
should not pay a share of power line tariffs transmitting power from out of state
that did not have in-state equal recognition and benefit. Instead of supporting its
position, this assertion caused the Seventh Circuit to respond to this argument,
even though it was not at the core of the tariff issue before the Court. Id.
273. Id.
274. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013).
275. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
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tice Scalia, concurring in the majority opinion in West Lynn Creamery,
submitted that “subsidies for in-state industry . . . would clearly be
invalid under any formulation of the Court’s guiding principle” for
dormant Commerce Clause cases.276
2.

The Second Circuit Holding of Unconstitutional State
Regulation of Energy in Interstate Commerce

In 2012, a federal district court found state attempts to regulate
wholesale power pricing and to discriminate in the preference for instate regulation of power moving in interstate commerce were preempted and violated the dormant Commerce Clause.277 The district
court ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor against state regulation of energy in
the state on a federal preemption claim and a dormant Commerce
Clause claim, and found that a second preemption claim was not yet
ripe for determination.278 On appeal by the State, in 2013 the Second
Circuit affirmed the unconstitutionality of the state regulation of energy under the Supremacy Clause, and found other claims not yet ripe
for review without overruling the trial court’s substantive rulings:279
We also do not have a factual record concerning incidental effects of such an
agreement on interstate commerce . . . . This case therefore does not present a
“concrete dispute affecting cognizable current concerns of the parties within
the meaning of Article III,” and is therefore not “ripe within the constitutional
sense.”280

The difference between the federal trial court and the Second Circuit opinions in this matter is one of slight distinction on the procedural posture of whether certain claims were yet ripe for decision
procedurally or first needed to be decided by FERC before coming to
federal court, but the Second Circuit opinion did not disagree on the
substance of any trial court determinations281: “An agreement requir276. Id. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring).
277. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 236–39 (D.
Vt. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 733 F.3d 393.
278. Id.
279. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, 733 F.3d 393.
280. Id. at 430–31 (quoting Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 489 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir.2007)).
281. Under the Supremacy Clause, the Filed Rate doctrine and the Federal Power Act,
The [trial] court then held that even if Entergy were to be forced to enter
into a new PPA [power purchase agreement] in violation of the marketbased tariff, its recourse would be to have the agreement reviewed by
FERC. However, the court concluded that ‘it is not clear what preemptive effect the [Federal Power Act] has to prevent [Vermont] from refusing to consider continued operation without such an agreement,’ as there
would be no such agreement to review. The court thus declined to enjoin
the defendants on the basis of Entergy’s Federal Power Act claim.
Id. at 407 (citations omitted). Both courts agreed that this issue was not yet ripe
for review since FERC review had not yet occurred prior to court action. Id. at
433. “The [trial] court found unconstitutional and issued an injunction ‘enjoining
Defendants from conditioning Vermont Yankee’s continued operation on the exis-
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ing Vermont Yankee to allot a certain percentage of it output to satisfy
local demand would also likely violate the dormant Commerce
Clause.”282 In a footnote, the court added, “Agreements of this nature
would be “scrutinized strictly, i.e., ‘the burden falls on the State to
justify [the discrimination] both in terms of the local benefits flowing
from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.’ ”283
3.

Recent Federal Trial Court Constitutional Energy Decisions

There are other cases before federal district courts and not yet at
the appellate level that are also contesting the constitutionality of energy regulation, several of which have found state actions unconstitutional. In 2014, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
struck down Minnesota’s carbon emissions statute, finding that the
statute impermissibly regulated extraterritorial commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.284 The statute at issue, Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act (NGEA), sought to limit
increases in “statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions.”285
The statute prohibits any “person” from importing or committing to
import power from a new large energy facility286 or entering into a
new long-term power purchase agreement that would contribute to
statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions.287 North Dakota,
along with several coal-dependent utilities and power plants, brought
a lawsuit against Minnesota, alleging the statute violated the Commerce Clause.288

282.
283.
284.
285.

286.
287.
288.

tence of a below-market PPA with Vermont utilities.’ ” Id. at 408. The Second
Circuit did not disagree with the substantive decision on the dormant Commerce
Clause, but ruled on procedural grounds, holding that this issue was not ripe for
review until plaintiffs actually entered such a forced PPA with the state. Id. at
433. “Accordingly, the analysis required under the dormant Commerce Clause
may not be performed, and so Entergy’s claim is unripe at this time.” Id. at 431.
Id.
Id. at 431, n.36 (quoting Brown& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d
200, 209 (2d Cir. 2003).
North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. 2014).
See id. at 898 (citing MINN. STAT. § 216H.03(2) (2014)). “Statewide power sector
carbon dioxide emissions” are defined as “the total annual emissions of carbon
dioxide from the generation of electricity within the state and all emissions of
carbon dioxide from the generation of electricity imported from outside the state
and consumed in Minnesota.” Id.
MINN. STAT. § 216H.03(2).
Id. § 216H.03(3)(3).
Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891. Plaintiffs also claimed the statute violates the
Supremacy Clause because it is preempted by the Clean Air Act and the Federal
Power Act, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs also sought declaratory judgment
that the Federal Power Act preempts the statute. In 2012, the court granted
partial judgment on counts four and six in favor of the defendants. Id. at 908. In
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The court held that a statute’s plain meaning could not be disregarded where its language is clear and unambiguous.289 It found that
the plain language of the statute violated the extraterritoriality doctrine when it “require[d] people or businesses to conduct their out-ofstate commerce in a certain way” regardless of legislative intent or
whether it had effects within the state, and was therefore per se invalid.290 “The critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”291 A
statute’s practical effect is evaluated not only by looking at its consequential effects, but also at how it would interact with the legitimate
regulatory schemes of other states, and what the effect there would be
if many States adopted similar legislation.292
In addition to regulating wholly out-of-state activity, the court determined that the NGEA also improperly required out-of-state
merchants to seek regulatory approval before transacting with other
non-Minnesota entities.293 According to the court, if multiple states
were to adopt similar legislation, entities involved in an interconnected multistate system like MISO could potentially be subject to
several state laws regardless of whether they were transacting commerce in those states: “[T]he current marketplace for electricity would
come to a grinding halt.”294 The NGEA constituted extraterritorial
legislation and was per se invalid under the dormant Commerce
Clause.295 Although plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint sought an award
of costs and expenses incurred in the litigation, they did not raise the
issue of attorneys’ fees in their summary judgment motion papers.296
This finding of a violation of the dormant clause is consistent with
the trial court determination in Rocky Mountain and the dissenting
opinion when it was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Except for the distinction that Rocky Mountain deals with storable liquid fuels, while
Heydinger deals with electricity which is not storable and moves in
interstate commerce, these cases are similar in purpose and extraterritorial impact. Heydinger involved the state regulating the sale in
the state of certain interstate power transactions, and in this regard is
more similar to the California LCFS than, and is distinguished on

289.
290.

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

2014, having found for the Plaintiffs on Count one (the dormant Commerce
Clause), the Court denied the remaining counts as moot. Id.
Id. at 909 (citing Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790, 792 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Id. at 911 (quoting Cotto Waxo Co., 46 F.3d at 793). Because the Court found that
the NGEA violates the extraterritoriality doctrine, it did not address whether the
statute is discriminatory or survives the Pike balancing test. Id.
Id. (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
Id.
Id. at 918–19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 919.
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these facts applied to the dormant Commerce Clause from, two other
2013 federal trial court decisions. Those two decisions include a Maryland case, in which the federal trial court applied the Pike balancing
test, and determined that because Maryland only provided incentives
for location of facilities in the state but did not restrict whether the
output of these facilities was sold in state or out of state, it did not
burden interstate commerce.297 The statute was found to restrict the
location of power facilities but not restrict either facially or in its practical effect their commercial sales in commerce, and thus was subject
only to the balancing test of Pike,298 which the plaintiffs could not satisfy.299 The state regulation was held to be unconstitutional, nonetheless, under the Supremacy Clause, and the prevailing plaintiffs
submitted applications to recover their attorneys’ fees.300 A similar
determination of unconstitutionality of state energy regulation based
on the Supremacy Clause, rather than the Commerce Clause, also was
reached by a federal district court in New Jersey and upheld by the
Third Circuit on similar facts of state regulation of location, but not
sales in commerce. Attorneys’ fees were also sought by the successful
plaintiffs.301
The Supreme Court has found states to have impermissibly favored in-state economic interests over out-of-state economic interests
by providing tax credits only for in-state sales of products actually produced in state,302 precluding out-of-state producers from shipping
products directly to in-state consumers,303 and providing property tax
exemptions to in-state entities that primarily serve state residents but
not to in-state entities which principally serve interstate clientele.304
California does not regulate physical locational preferences as did
New Jersey and Maryland in the matters above. The LCFS does not
employ tax credits or exemption, or bar shipping of interstate commerce, but it does regulate interstate commerce at the state level.
With LCFS, California, by state regulation, is incentivizing the actual
sale of commodities based on GHG lifecycle emissions keyed to the
location of the origin of the commerce. California regulates interstate
297. PPL Energyplus, LLC. v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790 (D. Md. 2013) (concerning field preemption and conflict preemption on wholesale power prices), aff’d,
753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014).
298. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
299. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
300. Id.
301. PPL Energyplus, LLC. v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D. N.J. 2013) (concerning
field preemption on wholesale power prices and rates), aff’d sub nom. PPL
Energyplus, LLC. v. Solomon, 753 F.3d 467 (3d Cir. 2014).
302. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271 (1988).
303. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 473–74 (2005).
304. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 576–77
(1997).
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commerce, which is suspect, but does so based on scientific and quantitative mechanisms, which adds a second dimension.
4.

The Circuits’ “Virtual Split”

What comparison of these three simultaneous circuit court decisions tells one is that in the one instance where the state regulation
was upheld, California had engaged in an elaborate effort to quantify
the actual GHG emissions associated with long-distance travel and
the use of coal-fired power in the Midwest production of renewable
ethanol commerce. While still discriminating to a degree against outof-state commerce, in the California matter there was a scientific basis
for the state regulation. This scientific rationale was not present in
the statute addressed by the Seventh Circuit or the Second Circuit.
Quantitative rigor matters when addressing a market in electricity or
the scientific aspects of environmental impact.
However, the Ninth Circuit opinion had a strong dissent, whereas
the Seventh Circuit and Second Circuit opinions were unanimous. In
terms of the court positions, there is at least a “virtual split” of interpretation of the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit majority position is
in the minority of these three simultaneous decisions.
The high court historically reverses the majority of all cases it reviews.305 The Ninth Circuit’s opinions have competed for being the
most overturned by the Supreme Court,306 and the Ninth Circuit has
been overturned more than other circuits by the Supreme Court when
it makes decisions on environmental matters.307 In the Supreme
Court term ending in 2009, including environmental matters, the
Ninth Circuit was overturned in fifteen of the sixteen cases reviewed
and in five out of five of its environmental opinions: “Experts, including former law clerks, say the Supreme Court justices are more inclined to look over the shoulders of the 9th Circuit judges they suspect
of favoring the underdog.”308 In 2013, the Ninth Circuit was unani305. Williams, supra note 12.
306. See CONSTANCE E. BAGELY & DIANE W. SAVAGE, MANAGERS AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 64 (Jack W. Calhoun et al. eds., 6th
ed. 2010).
307. Jonathan H. Adler, Is the Ninth Circuit Due for Environmental Correction?,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 20, 2012, 10:05 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/06/
20/is-the-ninth-circuit-due-for-environmental-correction/, archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/9ZJL-N5GB. In 2008–2009, the Supreme Court heard six environmental cases—five of which were from the Ninth Circuit. In those cases, the
Ninth Circuit ruled in favored of the environmental groups, but the Supreme
Court reversed them all. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States,
556 U.S. 599 (2009); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009); Coeur
Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009); Winter v.
NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
308. Williams, supra note 12.

854

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:807

mously overturned by the Supreme Court on an environmental
matter.309
Several separate challenges to state energy regulation on dormant
Commerce Clause claims were either quickly settled by the government in favor or the claimant,310 were unsuccessfully defended by the
state,311 have split-outcome decisions at the trial and appellate
levels,312 are still pending,313 or were side-tracked by procedural issues which do not reach the merits of the constitutionality of the challenged provision.314 A suit alleging that Massachusetts’s renewable
energy incentives violated the dormant Commerce Clause was set309. L.A. Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. NRDC, 133 S. Ct. 710 (2013). The court unanimously ruled to overturn a Ninth Circuit decision, supporting Los Angeles
County’s view that water flowing between natural and channelized sections is
simply a transfer of the same water and should not be seen as a permitted discharge. Id. at 711. “[The Court] granted certiorari on the following question:
Under the [Clean Water Act], does a ‘discharge of pollutants’ occur when polluted
water ‘flows from one portion of a river that is navigable water of the United
States, through a concrete channel or other engineered improvement in the river,’
and then ‘into a lower portion of the same river’?” Id. at 712. The Court held “the
flow of water from an improved portion of a navigable waterway into an unimproved portion of the very same waterway does not qualify as a discharge of pollutants under the [Clean Water Act].” Id. at 713.
310. See, e.g., Stipulation of Dismissal, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No.
4:10-cv-40070-TSH (D. Mass. May 28, 2013); Order Accepting Proposed Tariff Revisions, Subject to Conditions, and Addressing Related Complaint, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 135 FERC ¶ 61,022 (April 12, 2011) (No. ER11-2875-000), 2011
WL 1383624.
311. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach,
486 U.S. 269 (1988); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331
(1982); Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d
764 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Schuette v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014); Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1278 (2014); Alliance for Clean Coal v.
Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 596–97 (7th Cir. 1995); Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v.
Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Vt. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 733 F.3d
393 (2d Cir. 2013); Rocky Mountain II, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011),
rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014); Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F.
Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993), aff’d sub nom. Alliance for Clean Coal, 44 F.3d
591.
312. See Missouri ex rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Assoc. v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 386
S.W.3d 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing circuit court decision on state energy
regulation).
313. See PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D.N.J. 2013) (finding
field preemption on wholesale power prices and rates), aff’d sub nom. PPL
EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, No. 13-4330, 13-4501, 2014 WL 4454999 (3d Cir.
Sept. 11, 2014) PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790 (D. Md.
2013) (finding field preemption and conflict preemption on wholesale power
prices), aff’d, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014).
314. Am. Tradition Inst. v. Colorado, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1236 (D. Colo. 2012) (finding the Eleventh Amendment protected Colorado from suit).
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tled.315 The supremacy of federal control over climate change issues
was also evidenced recently when the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld EPA’s imposition of federal Clean Air Act implementation
plans for states that failed to require Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality permits for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases.316 While the challenge was dismissed on standing, it
distinguished the environmental regulation from the higher concern
of federal coercion of the states, as identified in the prior Supreme
Court decision on the Affordable Care Act.317
In 2013, the Supreme Court held that California’s largest city was
preempted by federal law from imposing additional regulation on
diesel truck emissions for those trucks that accessed its port.318
While addressing state and local environmental regulation,
the Supreme Court held that federal law preempts state and local
law.319 In late 2013, New Jersey’s in-state energy facility location preferences for new power generation were found unconstitutional,320 as was Maryland’s similar regulation.321
315. TransCanada, an independent power company with a wind project in Maine,
challenged the constitutionality of Massachusetts’s renewable portfolio standard
program, given that under previous Massachusetts law, out-of-state generators
were allowed to bid to supply power. Complaint at 1, TransCanada Power Mktg.
Ltd., No. 4-10-cv-40070-FDS (D. Mass. Apr. 16, 2010), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/QH5K-Y5GE. TransCanada alleged dormant Commerce Clause violations in the requirement that state utilities enter long-term contracts with instate new renewable energy projects, and that solar renewable energy credits be
earned only by in-state solar photovoltaic power projects, regardless of where the
power generation creating the renewable energy credits were sold. Erin
Ailworth, State Looking to Settle Suit Over Law on Clean Energy, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 27, 2010, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/EV9C-C4EG. Rather than risk
having its programs exposed to constitutional scrutiny by the federal courts, Massachusetts immediately settled this lawsuit, re-opened the request for bidding,
allowed out-of-state as well as in-state competitors to bid and gave TransCanada
renewable credits for contracts that did not otherwise qualify under the statute.
Partial Settlement Agreement at 1–4, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd., No. 4-10cv-40070-FDS (D. Mass. May 2010), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/GY9G9C84.
316. See Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
317. Id. at 197.
318. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles, 133 U.S. 2096, 2099 (2013).
319. Id.
320. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D.N.J. 2013) (finding New
Jersey’s Long Term Capacity Agreement Pilot Program Act to violate the United
States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause because it was preempted by the Federal
Power Act by both field and conflict preemption), aff’d sub nom. PPL EnergyPlus,
LLC v. Solomon, No. 13-4330, 2014 WL 4454999 (3d Cir. Sept. 11, 2014). In 2011,
New Jersey enacted legislation to encourage the acquisition by utilities of the
output of 2,000 Mw of new in-state power projects. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d at
393. Power generators in the North Atlantic region filed a complaint with FERC
alleging discrimination against New Jersey’s statute ordering utilities to sign
long-term contracts only with in-state generation facilities that bid to receive re-
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Can the Ninth Circuit Change Many Decades of Supreme
Court Interpretation of the Constitution?

Appellate courts cannot directly negate Supreme Court precedent
when applying the law. However, it is not quite so straightforward.
Here, the Ninth Circuit majority was not so much overruling or contradicting the Supreme Court, as it was creating an alternative judicial rationale for a different result.
In fact, lower federal courts have charted alternative paths in response to recent Supreme Court decisions. As one example, in United
States v. Atlantic Research Corp., the Supreme Court noted that costs
incurred “voluntarily” can only be allocated by recourse to § 107 of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), without defining what is “voluntary,” other than
stating that reimbursing others’ costs does not qualify: “a [potentional
responsible party (PRP)] that pays money to satisfy a settlement
agreement or a court judgment may pursue § 113(f) contribution.”322
“But by reimbursing response costs paid by other parties, the PRP has
not incurred its own costs of response and therefore cannot recover
under § 107(a).”323
Without precisely negating the Supreme Court decision on this environmental matter, lower federal courts can, with wide discretion, interpret whether costs incurred were “voluntary” or not. Several
circuit courts of appeals have creatively and inconsistently defined
when an action is or is not “voluntary,” and frustrated the impact of a
unanimous Supreme Court holding, which invalidated the prior decigional multistate PJM independent system operator (“ISO”) capacity payments.
Mary Powers, PJM Generators File Complaint with FERC Seeking Relief from
NJ In-State Generation Law, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Feb. 7, 2011, at 11, 13. In
response, in 2011, FERC amended the PJM ISO rules to prevent New Jersey
state law from attempting to encourage construction of in-state power generation
by, in part, causing them to bid power into the PJM system at suppressed prices
in order to win capacity auctions. Mary Powers, Rebuffed by FERC Ruling, New
Jersey BPU Plans to Look Again at How to Attract New Generation, ELECTRIC
UTIL. WK., May 23, 2011, at 4, 6 (stating that FERC, on April 12, 2011 eliminated
a PJM rule that allowed a prior exemption for projects to make minimum offer
prices when tempered by state energy programs). A lawsuit regarding New
Jersey energy regulation by several existing independent power generators asserted that the New Jersey state law is in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause because it is predicated on in-state “favoritism,” and the New Jersey act is
a “blatant and explicit effort to promote the construction of new generation facilities in New Jersey.” Id.
321. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 796 (D. Md. 2013) (finding Maryland’s regulation to violate the Supremacy Clause by field preemption
but not to violate the dormant Commerce Clause), aff’d, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir.
2014).
322. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139 n.6 (2007) (describing
proper allocation of voluntary costs under CERCLA).
323. Id. at 139.
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sions of eleven circuit courts of appeals.324 In so doing, circuit courts
have realized the same result in individual cases, that the Supreme
Court unanimously struck as a general principle of interpretation of
federal law.325
V. CAN ANY CLIMATE-INTERESTED STATE NOW
DISCRIMINATE AGAINST INTERSTATE COMMERCE
IRRESPECTIVE OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT?
Following the Ninth Court majority decision, the distance of travel,
alone, becomes a factor for a state to discriminate against anything
produced outside the state. And the decision allows states to create
different zones at the state boundary and impose costs based on GHG
associated with commerce travelling across these zones established at
state lines.326
A.

Trash-Talking at the Appellate Level Vis-à-Vis the
Supreme Court

Justice Scalia, concurring in the prior Supreme Court opinion in
West Lynn Creamery, noted that “subsidies for in-state industry . . .
would clearly be invalid under any formulation of the Court’s guiding
principle” for dormant Commerce Clause cases.327 In contrast,
A.B. 32 in California and its regulations impose a carbon credit or fee
requirement associated with products made with out-of-state electricity or travelling greater distances into the state.
Under the breadth of the Ninth Circuit majority decision, states
can and may now resume their prior practice of blocking the importation and disposal of out-of-state trash into their states, under a new
GHG emission rationale. Until now, in more than a dozen cases that
324. See Steven Ferrey, Toxic “Plain Meaning” and “Moonshadow”: Supreme Court
Unanimity and Unexpected Consequences, 24 VILL. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2013);
Steven Ferrey, The Superfund Cost Allocation Liability Conflicts Among the Federal Courts, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 249 (2009).
325. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir.
2010) (finding state settlement only allowed a § 103 action, not § 107 action,
where the settling party, instead, wrote the check to the government, which then
in turn used the money to retain and pay the remediation contractor); ITT Indus.,
Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing proper remedy
for PRPs and court’s struggles in finding appropriate remedy); Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473
F.3d 824, 837 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding § 107 applied because Metropolitan Water
voluntarily financed and performed cleanup); Boarhead Farm Agreement Group
v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 427, 435 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (concluding Third Circuit precedent precludes PRPs from bringing § 107 claim).
326. Rocky Mountain II, 720 F.3d 1070 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014).
327. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 208 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasis omitted).
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proceeded to the Supreme Court, states have unsuccessfully attempted to do this for decades.328
1.

Methane CH4

Trash impacts the environment. Because waste is composed of a
high percentage of organic materials—paper, food scraps, and yard
waste—over time, bacterial decomposition of organic material, the volatilization of certain wastes, and chemical reactions within the landfill
create copious quantities of gas.329 About two-thirds of the total volume of waste is organic matter that will degrade to release methane
under anaerobic conditions.330 This landfill gas is comprised primarily of carbon dioxide, CO2, and 45%–60% methane, CH4, while containing smaller amounts of nonmethane organic compounds
(NMOCs)331 and some other trace organic elements. The chemical
destiny of the bulk of municipal solid wastes is degradation to methane molecules.332
328. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
329. Landfill Gas Primer – Chapter 2: Landfill Gas Basics, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY (November 2001), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/
landfill/html/ch2.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/RWL4-AQXQ.
330. Municipal Solid Waste, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/
nonhaz/municipal/index.htm (last updated Feb. 28, 2014), archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/GP7V-AYXP. The composition of typical municipal solid waste is
27.4% paper; 13.5% yard waste; 14.5% food waste; 6.3% wood; 12.7% plastics;
8.7% textiles, leather and rubber; and the remainder comprised of metals, glass
and other materials. Id.
331. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RENEWABLE ENERGY ANNUAL 1996 at 99–100 (1997),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/G7RR-WQTY.
332. Bacteria that adapt to relatively oxygen-free environments—including the intestinal tracts of animals, bogs, marshes, rice paddies, arctic permafrost, and garbage dumps—produce methane. STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER, GLOBAL WARMING 101
(1989). Methane is different from other greenhouse gases due to its immediate
impact on the atmosphere and its short atmosphere lifetime. EPA, METHANE
EMISSIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONTROL 20–21 (1990) (reporting the findings
of two international workshops sponsored by the International Panel on Climate
Change which focused current methane emissions and opportunities to control
these emissions) [hereinafter METHANE EMISSIONS]. Methane has twenty to
thirty times more greenhouse capacity (the ability to trap infrared heat) per molecule than carbon dioxide. SCHNEIDER, supra, at 101. Or put another way, a
gram of methane absorbs seventy times more infrared radiation than a gram of
carbon dioxide. METHANE EMISSIONS, supra, at 11. Methane in the atmosphere
also contributes to tropospheric ozone formation, another greenhouse gas, and
potentially stratospheric ozone depletion. Id. at 21; SCHNEIDER, supra, at 101.
These characteristics make methane an extremely potent greenhouse gas, giving
it 120 times more power to cause global warming than carbon dioxide. METHANE
EMISSIONS, supra, at 21. This characteristic is called “high global warming potential.” Id. at 20–21. Global warming potential is defined as “the ratio of the warming cause by the emissions of a unit of a trace gas to that caused by the emission
of carbon dioxide at current concentration levels.” Id. at 20. Monitoring indicates
that methane levels in the atmosphere have increased by almost 100% since

2015]

OVERRULING THE SUPREME COURT

859

Approximately 29% of U.S. anthropogenic methane emissions—8.1
million metric tons annually—are from waste management.333 Landfills, representing 98% of this 8.1 million metric tons of methane emissions, are by far the single largest source.334 Approximately 4.9
million metric tons of the 8.1 million tons of landfill methane annually
are captured as landfill gas (LFG), and 2.5 million metric tons of this
is used for productive energy use while 2.4 million metric tons of the
recovered LFG are flared with no productive energy capture.335 The
United States is responsible for approximately 9% of worldwide methane emissions.336 According to EPA data, as displayed in Figure 1,
methane constitutes the second most prevalent GHG, after CO2.337

333.

334.
335.
336.

337.

1800. See id. at 21. This increase is mainly attributed to population growth and
human related activities, accounting for about 70% of the total methane emissions. METHANE EMISSIONS, supra, at 7. Although methane presents numerous
problems when released directly into the earth’s atmosphere, it presents significant benefits when utilized as an energy source, where methane is a main component of natural gas. SCHNEIDER, supra, at 101. When compared with fossil fuels,
natural gas has significantly lower emissions of carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxide, and particulates. METHANE EMISSIONS, supra, at 37. When directly substituted for electricity generated by fossil fuels, significant reductions of
carbon dioxide emissions are achieved. Id.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EMISSION OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES
2001 at 40 (2002), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/X49J-432C. This value has
been decreasing because of a robust effort to capture methane for productive purposes or destruction. Id. Landfills constitute the single largest source of methane emissions within the United States responsible for almost a quarter of
human-related methane emissions, while human-related activities such as natural gas and petroleum systems, livestock and wastewater treatment, along with
landfills account for other sources of methane emissions. EPA, INVENTORY OF
U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2003 at 261 (2005), archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/3MZH-BHRH.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 333. The remaining 2% of these emissions from
waste management are associated with domestic wastewater treatment programs. Id.
Id. at 40.
The EPA estimates that in 2000, global levels of methane emissions reached approximately 5,854.86 MtCO2eq (million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent),
while the U.S. emitted roughly 546.42 MtCO2eq. EPA, GLOBAL ANTHROPOGENIC
NON-CO2 GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: 1990–2020 app. A-2 (2006), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/2567-M92X.
See Carbon Pollution Standards, supra note 34.
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Figure 1:

Methane is more than 20 times more detrimental for warming the
Earth, molecule-for-molecule, than CO2.338 Given how dangerous
methane is for the environment,339 and how ignored it has been to
date among the two primary GHG emissions, its regulation deserves
more attention. Now for the first time, the Ninth Circuit has created a
distinction for regulation or prohibition of trash entering another
state. However, as noted,340 it has no discernible impact on the particular state where methane is emitted, or for that matter, on the
country in which it is emitted.
2.

Movement of Commerce

Ethanol and fuel have to be ultimately delivered to consumers, so
they can purchase and consume them where they physically are. In
contrast, there is no environmental purpose served in moving trash
long distances. Every state can accommodate trash disposal locally;
every state has land into which to put trash. Although still a product
in commerce,341 trash only needs to go into the ground, and not to
downstream customers, unless used as the fuel input for a trash-to338.
339.
340.
341.

FERREY, supra note 5, at 15, tbl.2-1.
Id.
See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.
See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). Unlike fuel,
which is a product still in the course of commerce and must be transported to end
users, waste shares none of these characteristics.
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energy facility.342 Because of this, there is no compelling environmental or scientific case for transportation of waste, and it has even less
grounds to be immune from state GHG regulation than ethanol does.
Landfilling trash locally avoids the CO2-emitting transportation component otherwise associated with its disposal in another state.
Under the Ninth Circuit majority opinion, any state concerned
about GHGs could impose a carbon index requiring each such transported ton of waste from outside a state’s local zone to purchase tradable credits reflecting the distance of its travel, with the revenue from
such sales going to the state. There is separate litigation in California
contesting the amount of state revenue collected under A.B. 32 and its
legitimacy, which the trial court decided was legitimately authorized,
although a close call.343
Many states, over a period of years, sought other ways to block the
movement of external trash into their states. Some of these states
attempted to do so with the imposition of additional fees on imported
trash into the state.344 The rationale for these additional charges was
that out-of-state waste imposed more costs on the recipient state.345
However, the states picked somewhat arbitrary values for the extra
charge, rather than basing it on an actual calculated additional cost or
on a scientific basis for the environmental. All of these schemes previously were blocked by the Supreme Court applying its interpretation
of the Constitution.346
342. For a discussion of trash-to-energy technology, see Waste to Energy, in STEVEN
FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER: DEVELOPMENT, COGENERATION, UTILITY REGULATION § 2:48 (34th ed. 2014). In 2003, there were 107 active waste-toenergy combustion facilities in operation in the United States. Scott M. Kaufman
et al., The State of Garbage in America, BIOCYCLE, January 2004, at 31, archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/6K8Q-4GN2. The most significant deployment of wasteto-energy combustion facilities to handle municipal solid waste is in the New England region, where 34% of the waste stream is handled in this manner. Id. The
least use of this technology is in the Rocky Mountain and Midwest regions. Id.
Conversely, the areas where the largest percentage of waste is landfilled are the
Rocky Mountain region (90%), the Midwest region (75%), the South region (69%),
and the Great Lakes region (68%). Id.
343. See Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. 34-2012-80001313 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/3ADL-UDXE (challenging a bill attempting to lower greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by
2020).
344. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (invalidating Oregon’s increased per-ton surcharge on waste generated in other states);
Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336–37 (1992) (invalidating Alabama’s imposition of an additional disposal fee on hazardous waste generated
outside the state but disposed of within Alabama).
345. Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 97.
346. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 394–95
(1994); Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 108; Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 355 (1992); Hunt, 504 U.S. at 336–37;
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. Cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-
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This Rocky Mountain court of appeals majority opinion is the only
holding to factor in financially the distance of transportation of the
item being transported in treating commerce differently depending on
its place of origin. In both the Oregon Waste and Hunt cases, the Supreme Court found that there was nothing in the differentiation between in-state and out-of-state waste to justify any difference in stateimposed price or fee. Such discriminatory state actions are sanctioned
by the Ninth Circuit whether imposed by statute or by regulation of a
state agency.
The Ninth Circuit majority noted that commodities are deemed to
compete with each other in a single market.347 Therefore, any state
can impose a quantitatively-determined regulatory imposition or fee
requirement on trash entering this market from a zone outside the
state to control transportation-related GHGs and methane formation
and release within the state. Even with a GHG emission basis for
regulating distance of travel of commerce, it still has the effect of geographic discrimination based on the point of origin of the commerce.
Waste disposal bans on out-of-state waste cases have been before
the Supreme Court more than any other environmental issue. The
primary holding in all of these cases by the Supreme Court was that
there would be strict scrutiny of discrimination against commerce
based on its point of origin. It remains to be determined whether a
GHG rationale seized by the Ninth Circuit majority will be upheld to
change the interpretation and application of the Constitution by the
Supreme Court.
B.

Today Renewable Fuels, Tomorrow Food, Electricity and
Airline Travel?

The Rocky Mountain appellate court majority opinion would seem
to allow any state, in the interest of GHG emission reduction, to limit
imports or require acquisition of expensive credits for food imports,
electricity, or air travel to California: “California may regulate with
reference to local harms, structuring its internal markets to set incentives for firms to produce less harmful products for sale in California.”348 There is no limit on what commercial imports could be
regulated based on their transport distance and use of fossil-fuel-fired
electricity in production at the location where the commerce is produced, as noted in some amici briefs to the Ninth Circuit.349
Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (finding county’s
ordinances had no discriminatory impact on interstate commerce).
347. Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014).
348. Id. at 1104.
349. See Brief for Michael Wang, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 10,
Rocky Mountain III, 730 F.3d 1070 (No. 12-15131, 12-15135), 2012 WL 2376703
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Eat This!

As shown in Figure 1, transportation is not the most significant
source of CO2 and GHG emissions: electric power production is the
largest source, and agriculture is among the top five sources.350 If a
state can legally impose carbon indexes, values, and eventual costs
based on transportation distance and fuels, which discriminate based
on the geographic origin of the commerce and against out-of-state
commerce, as the Ninth Circuit majority has upheld, a state could
next provide carbon indexes and regulation reflecting:
• the less-favorable out-of-state GHG emissions associated with
electric higher-carbon-emitting power imported into the state;
• agricultural imports into the state; and
• out-of-state wine.
There are abundant in-state substitutes for both out-of-state renewable and fossil-fuel-fired electricity and out-of-state produced food.351
California grows so much of its own food and is a leading international
producer of wines, that there is not a significant need to import more
food, and more wine of same varieties produced in-state than California can consume. Consequently, importing wine and food into California increases GHGs in their transportation into the state. The
amount of food and wine transported to California is certainly of a
generally similar magnitude as to the amount of ethanol (covered by
the LCFS) imported to California as a ten percent gasoline additive.
There is no reason that food and wine should not have a California
lifecycle carbon rating, as does low-carbon fuels, pursuant to the
Ninth Circuit opinion.
This was raised by a different judge in the Ninth Circuit after the
Ninth Circuit’s Rocky Mountain opinion. A petition for a rehearing en
banc at the Ninth Circuit was filed by the Rocky Mountain plaintiffs
and denied, with members of the Ninth Circuit dissenting from that
denial noting that “California could—under the majority’s reasoning—penalize out-of-state wineries to account for the environmental
effects of transporting their wines to California.”352 This is true, as
well, of all food imports. In allowing such state GHG-emission-based
discrimination against out-of-state renewable fuels,353 each of the
other major GHG emission sources identified in Figure 1 should be

350.
351.
352.
353.

(noting just a few of the items whose production and use could attract lifecycle
scrutiny and, by extension, regulation akin to the LCFS: newspapers, refrigerators, light bulbs, camp stoves, and computers).
See supra fig.1.
For discussion of different electric generation technologies, see FERREY, supra
note 342, at ch. 2.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 740 F.3d at 518.
Id.
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equally regulated for the same GHG-emission purpose. This may be
an important element for a comprehensive carbon control policy. And
the federal government could certainly enact such a policy.
However, the Supreme Court, and a very recent unanimous opinion of the Seventh Circuit, cast doubt on the ability of an individual
state to require this. Regarding power, the Supreme Court held that
“it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy, a product used in virtually every home and
every commercial or manufacturing facility. No State relies solely on
its own resources in this respect.”354 The Supreme Court does not
permit discrimination based on the origin of electricity in enforcing
the dormant Commerce Clause.355 The Ninth Circuit majority opinion is not consistent with Supreme Court precedent, if the state discrimination is justified to prevent higher-carbon coal-fired power
importation into the state.356 It would allow any state to discriminate
based on the geographic origin of the power and its imputed GHG
emissions. It places the state into the position to burden interstate
commerce in electricity.
2.

Into Thin Air

Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit majority opinion, California could
impose a fee or credit requirement on every ticket for an airline passenger landing or taking off in San Francisco, Los Angeles, or San Diego because air travel emits significant GHGs. This action by a state
would be contrary to the U.S. national position against the European
Union’s efforts to implement a similar GHG fee on air travel into European Union countries.357 The original version of EU GHG regulation of airline travel covered GHG emissions for the entire length of
354. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982).
355. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 344 (1982).
356. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 456 (1992) (finding Oklahoma’s act violated
the Commerce Clause because it discriminated against interstate commerce);
FERC, 456 U.S. at 759; see also Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 595
(7th Cir. 1995) (discussing Supreme Court precedent that prohibits states from
discriminating against out-of-state waste and milk products).
357. See Mark Szakonyl, US Opposition to EU Airline Carbon Tax Builds, J. COM
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.joc.com/us-opposition-eu-airline-carbon-tax-builds_
20120802.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/D5PD-EBS3. The EU’s carbon
market expanded to cover airlines, triggering protests from countries including
the U.S., China, and India that prompted the EU to suspend the carbon curbs on
foreign flights for a year. Matthew Carr, EU Can Keep Airline Carbon Plan by
Using UN Credits, Emissions Trading Lobby Says, 44 ENV’T REP. 3019 (2013). A
new U.S. law shields U.S. carriers from the EU carbon legislation. Ewa Krukowska, Global Carbon Plan for Airlines Gets Initial UN Seal of Approval, 44 ENV’T
REP. 3018 (2013). Russia announced it was considering limits on European
flights over Siberia as retaliation against the EU GHG law. Id. China suspended
contracts for 27 orders for new EU Airbus wide-body jetliners in retaliation
against the EU GHG plan. Id.
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journeys into and out of the EU,358 as does the California GHG LCFS
carbon intensity index cover all GHG emissions for ethanol fuel into
and out of California. A September 2013 retreat allowed the EU to
continue its program only for flights within its airspace.359 The EU
suspended its carbon curbs on foreign flights for a year, which when it
expires next year, will resume covering GHGs for all airline trips to
and from Europe on the entire length of the flights even outside EU
airspace.360
3.

GHG Linkage

A contemporaneous decision on a related matter by the Ninth Circuit adds a curious twist to the pending carbon regulation issue for
California and other states. In a citizen suit seeking to compel Washington under the Clean Air Act to regulate GHG emissions from the
state’s five oil refineries, a different Ninth Circuit panel opinion at
approximately the same time as the California LCFS opinion found
the amount of GHG emissions involved not to satisfy the causality and
redressability requirements of an injury for legal standing.361 The
Ninth Circuit held that the chain of causality between Washington’s
alleged failure to regulate carbon and the plaintiffs’ specific, localized
injuries was too attenuated, and that the environmental group plaintiffs did not show that their injuries would be redressed by a court
order requiring the state to control GHG emissions from the largest
GHG emitters in the state, the five large oil refineries.362 In essence,
there was no significant connection between more than 5% of total instate GHG emissions emitted and climate change within the state:
According to WSPA’s expert, however, the effect of this emission on global
climate change is “scientifically indiscernible,” given the emission levels, the
dispersal of GHGs world-wide, and “the absence of any meaningful nexus between Washington refinery emissions and global GHG concentrations now or
as projected in the future.” Because a multitude of independent third parties
358. All flights to, from, and between EU airports were originally included in the ETS
as of Jan. 1, 2012, under a 2008 EU law 2008/101/EC. See Stephen Gardner,
European Union Agrees to Postpone Emissions Trading for International Airlines,
48 ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (BNA) 5 (March 12, 2013). However, after protests
from many countries, including China, Russia, and the United States, and following a promise that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) would
take action on greenhouse gas emissions from aviation, the EU adopted a “stopthe-clock” decision and suspended the inclusion of intercontinental flights. Id.
359. Krukowska, supra note 357.
360. Id.; Stephen Gardner, European Commission Proposes to Bring All Flights Across
EU Territory Back Into ETS, 200 ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (BNA) 1 (Oct. 16, 2013)
(“International airlines . . . would be included again in the European Union’s
Emissions Trading System (ETS) as of Jan. 1 for the portions of their flights that
take place in EU airspace under a proposed directive published by the European
Commission Oct. 16, 2013.”).
361. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1147 (9th Cir. 2013).
362. Id. at 1141.
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are responsible for the changes contributing to Plaintiffs’ injuries, the causal
chain is too tenuous to support standing.363

The decision relies on the Ninth Circuit’s earlier GHG decision in
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.364:
“The line of causation between the defendant’s action and the plaintiff’s harm
must be more than attenuated.” . . . “[W]here the causal chain involves numerous third parties whose independent decisions collectively have a significant effect on plaintiffs’ injuries, . . . the causal chain is too weak to support
standing.”
....
. . . “[G]lobal warming has been occurring for hundreds of years and is the
result of a vast multitude of emitters worldwide whose emissions mix quickly,
stay in the atmosphere for centuries, and, as a result, are undifferentiated in
the global atmosphere.”365

There arguably is a difference between an individual environmental group or individual standing to sue, and state standing to sue.366
The Supreme Court also spoke to injury from GHG emissions by specific use of fossil fuels, distinguished from EPA regulation of GHG
emissions. The American Electric Power Co. litigation plaintiffs alleged that the defendant electric companies were the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States, collectively responsible for
650 million tons annually—equivalent to 25% of emissions from the
domestic electric power sector, 10% of emissions from all human activities in the U.S., and 2.5% of all man-made emissions worldwide.367
Yet here, the Supreme Court held there was no standing for a legal
claim when a 2.5% contribution of the defendants to worldwide GHG
emissions was at issue.368
And while the litigation involving Washington oil refineries was
dismissed by the Ninth Circuit on standing matters, so that the ultimate merits were never addressed, the injury and redressability issues, which the Ninth Circuit discussed at some length and decided,
ultimately go to whether the court views any legal linkage between
the most significant and singular source of GHG emissions in a state
and the impact on climate change in that same state. These Washington oil refineries contributed more than 5% of all the GHG emissions
in the state.
The ethanol-related emissions in California arguably constitute an
even smaller percentage of total California in-state GHG emissions:
363. Id. at 1143–44 (citation omitted).
364. Id. (citing Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 867–68
(9th Cir. 2012)).
365. Id. at 1141–43 (quoting Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 867, 868).
366. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
367. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2011).
368. Id.
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Ethanol is used at a 10% blend in motor vehicle fuels.369 The entire
transportation sector of the California economy constitutes 38% of
California GHG emissions according to the California Energy Commission.370 Ten percent attributable to ethanol’s total component to
the 38% motor fuel category, is 3.8% of California GHGs.
Analyzing another case on a quantitative metric, the Massachusetts v. EPA Supreme Court decision considered evidence that U.S.
motor-vehicle emissions constituted 1.7 billon metric tons of CO2 emissions in 1999 alone, or over 6% of world-wide carbon dioxide emissions—which it concluded constitutes a “meaningful contribution” to
GHG concentrations, and thus, to global warming.371 California has
about 12% of U.S. population,372 and thus assuming that this percentage is roughly equivalent to use of motor fuels, about 0.6% of world
GHG emissions are attributed to California motor fuels, or about
0.06% to the ethanol fuel component of motor fuels used in California.
Whether a 0.06% “effect of this emission on global climate change is
‘scientifically indiscernible’ ” yet still poses a “significant effect on
plaintiffs’ injuries, . . . [or whether] the causal chain is too weak,”373
becomes an interesting question given this other contemporaneous decision of the Ninth Circuit, where 5.9% of total state GHG emissions
by the defendants was not deemed significant.374
These two Ninth Circuit decisions are distinct. One involving
Washington looks at individual claims for GHG damages against a
state failure to regulate, finding no linkage of damage from a greater
than 5% share of state GHG emissions.375 The present California
LCFS matter makes a finding that the less than 5% GHG emission
share related to ethanol is significant in terms of injury from GHG
emissions. The three-judge panels on these two contemporaneous
Ninth Circuit decisions were different, as were the parties. However,
each involved litigation between citizens and groups and a State regarding GHG regulation.
369. See Ethanol, FUELECONOMY.GOV, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/ethanol.shtml
(last visited Oct. 19, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8Q6V-GXZ4.
370. See Fuels and Transportation Division, CAL. ENERGY COMMISSION, http://www.energy.ca.gov/transportation/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2104), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/6VZE-3ZBL.
371. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525.
372. See California QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July, 8, 2014), http://quickfacts
.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/CVK7-UVP2
(estimating 316,128,839 people lived in the United States in 2013, of which
38,332,521 lived in California, which equals around 12%).
373. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1142, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 2013).
374. Id. at 1143.
375. Id. at 1145–46 (“Here, the GHG emissions are from five oil refineries in Washington, making up 5.9% of emissions in Washington.”).
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Going Up!

So can the Ninth Circuit sidestep and reorient Supreme Court precedent regarding a century of interpretation of the core requirements
of the Commerce Clause? The majority opinion assumes that it can if
state action is motivated by climate change control. The dissent and
the trial court, as well as decisions on state energy regulation in two
other circuit courts, disagree. This “virtual split” in interpretation
among three circuit courts begs for Supreme Court resolution in some
way at some level. This federalism issue is constitutional and federal,
and must some day be resolved. This resolution will fundamentally
shape state climate control options and state regulation of energy.

